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SEPARATIONS, BLOW-OUTS, AND
FALLOUT: A TREADISE ON THE
REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE
FORD-FIRESTONE TIRE RECALL
KEVIN M. MCDONALD"
"It will be of little avail to the people.., if the laws be so
voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they
cannot be understood.... Law is defined to be a rule of action; but
how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?'"
"I learned the human body in four years; I've studied TREAD
for six months and barely scratched the surface.'"
INTRODUCTION

This Article is the second of a two-part series on the
Transportation
Recall
Enhancement,
Accountability,
and
Documentation Act ("TREAD" or "TREAD Act" interchangeably).3
The first Article, entitled "Don't TREAD on Me," appeared in the
Fall 2001 edition of the Buffalo Law Review.4
That article
Attorney, Product & Regulatory Matters, Volkswagen of America, Inc.
Dr. Jur. (Doctor of Legal Sciences), University of the Saarland School of Law
and Business Sciences, Germany; LL.M.Eur. (Master of European Law),
Institute of European Studies, University of the Saarland, Germany; J.D.,
Washington University School of Law; B.A., Kalamazoo College. The views
and opinions written in this article are current through October 1, 2004
(unless otherwise noted) and reflect those only of the author and should not be
interpreted in any way to reflect those of Volkswagen or Audi or any of their
employees. The author thanks Nicholas J. Wittner, Assistant General
Counsel, Nissan North America, Inc., for sharing so openly his expertise and
thoughts on TREAD and for his critical review of the manuscript. Copyright ©
2004 Kevin M. McDonald. All rights reserved.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison).
2. The Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 41 (2002) (statement of Dr. Jeffrey
Runge,
Administrator
of
NHTSA),
available
at
http//energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-92.pdf [hereinafter Hearing].
3. Transportation
Recall
Enhancement,
Accountability,
and
Documentation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
4. Kevin M. McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me: Faster than a Tire Blowout,
Congress Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation that Treads on the Thirty-Five
Year Old Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1163-1218 (2001)
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appeared shortly after passage of the TREAD Act and focused on
three primary areas: (1) the high-profile events leading to the
Ford-Firestone recalls; (2) the congressional investigations into the
situation; and (3) the statutory requirements of the TREAD Act.5
Readers of that Article will recall that, in response to Ford's and
Firestone's actions and inactions as well as the lack of information
available to the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), Congress amended the Vehicle Safety
Act 6 to require that NHTSA issue a series of implementing
rulemakings to address perceived shortcomings in automotive
safety law. Congress intended for NHTSA to undertake several
key rulemakings to enhance its ability to carry out key provisions
of the Vehicle Safety Act, namely, those provisions that allow
NHTSA to identify vehicles and equipment that have safetyrelated defects.
At the heart of these rulemakings is a three-pronged string of
obligations to report (1) overseas recalls and "other safety
campaigns," (2) "early warning" information, and (3) sales of
defective or noncompliant tires. The most extensive reporting rule
is "early warning," which authorizes NHTSA to require
manufacturers to provide information to the extent that such
information may assist in identifying safety-related defects.7 The
purpose of requiring comprehensive early warning data is "to
assure that NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has
relevant data to promptly identify possible safety defects."8 That
some of this data would come from sources located overseas
reflects congressional intent that the TREAD Act in part apply
extraterritorially, which in turn requires a sensitivity to U.S. law
by affected multinational companies.9

[hereinafter McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me].
5. Id. See generally Nicholas J. Wittner, TREAD: The Long Road Ahead,
LJNS PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, June 2001, at 6 (providing another
perspective on the statutory requirements of the TREAD Act and discussing

the TREAD Act's requirements).
6. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3010130170 (2000).

7. TREAD § 3(b). This requirement arose out of an en bloc amendment
offered by Representative Cliff Stearns (R-FL) and passed on a voice vote
during the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection markup. See Michael Steel, PanelAdds Teeth to TREAD
Safety Bill, NAT'L J. NEWS SERV., Sept. 27, 2000. See also H.R. REP. No. 106954, at 13 (2000) (analyzing the TREAD Act).

8. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects, 69
Fed. Reg. 3292, 3293 (Jan. 23, 2004). ODI is the arm of NHTSA that is
responsible for conducting investigations to implement the Vehicle Safety Act
by identify'ing and correcting safety-related defects in vehicles and vehicle
equipment. See 49 C.F.R. § 554.5 (2003). See also infra note 100 and

accompanying text.
9. For example, legal commentators in Germany have written about the
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Since publication of the first Article in Fall 2001, NHTSA has
implemented the congressional directives. NHTSA has also issued
various amendments and interpretations. This Article examines
these developments, picking up from the point in time where the
first one left off. It is divided into three major sections: (1)
"Background," which discusses the impact of the TREAD Act on
both the automotive industry and NHTSA, as well as summarizes
the congressional activities since passage of the Act; (2) "TREAD's
Reporting Rules," which analyzes the requirements of TREAD's
three-pronged reporting scheme; and (3) "Increased Penalties,"
which summarizes the increased civil and criminal penalties
meant to buttress the new reporting requirements. The reader
may find it helpful to reference the first Article for supplemental
historical information.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Passageof the TREAD Act
During the late 1990s and 2000, a growing number of
consumers began complaining to NHTSA about premature tread
separation of Firestone tires mounted on Ford Explorers." By
May 2000, NHTSA opened a formal investigation into more than
59 million Firestone tires made in multiple sizes and lines over a
period of more than ten years prior to the opening of the
investigation."
On August 9, 2000, Firestone announced the recall of 14.4
million P235/75R15-sized Radial ATX, Radial ATX II, and
Wilderness AT tires. 2 Under the terms of the recall, Firestone
agreed to replace all such recalled tires that were still on the road,
or to pay up to $100 per tire to consumers who chose to replace
their tires with a competitor's brand.13 At the time Firestone

effect of the TREAD Act on companies doing business in the United States.
See, e.g., Gerhard M. Horstmann-Wilke, TREAD Act - Neue Regelungen in den
USA far Herstellervon Automobilen und Zubeh~r [TREAD Act - New Rules in
the United States for Automobile and Equipment Manufacturers], 5
HAFTPFLICHT INTERNATIONAL 162 (May 2003).

10. Standards

Enforcement

and

Defect

Investigation;

Defect

and

Noncompliance Reports; Record Retention, Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM), 66 Fed. Reg. 6532, 6533 (Jan. 22, 2001) [hereinafter

ANPRM]; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Tire Pressure Monitoring
Systems; Controls and Displays, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,982, 38,989 n.13 (July 26,
2001) [hereinafter TPMS NPRM].

11. See ANPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 6533; TPMS NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38989
n.13. See also Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. B-170,462 (D. Tex.
Mar. 12, 2004) [hereinafter BFS Settlement] (order approving settlement and
final judgment).

12. Id.
13. Id.
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announced the August 2000 recall, it estimated that
approximately 6.5 million tires subject to the recall were still on
the road. 4 In May 2001, Ford conducted its own recall, which is
the largest "product recall in automotive history,"" to replace 13
million of the Firestone Wilderness AT tires that were not subject
to Firestone's August 2000 recall, including 1.5 million tires that
were mounted on the vehicles as replacements during the initial
Firestone recall. 16
On October 4, 2001, NHTSA initially
determined that Firestone should recall certain fifteen-inch and
sixteen-inch Wilderness AT tires manufactured to specifications...
of Ford... prior to May 1998 that were equipped on sport utility
vehicles, and estimated that Firestone had produced about 3.5
million of those tires." Firestone agreed to replace for free any
additional affected tires on the road. 8 The August 2000 recall and
the replacement program of October 2001 covered approximately
18 million of the nearly 60 million tires in the NHTSA inquiry." In
NHTSA's October 4, 2001 decision, no concern was raised about
the two-thirds of the Firestone tires that were part of the
investigation that Firestone neither recalled nor replaced."0
NHTSA ultimately closed its investigation into all of the
remaining tires.2'
Shortly after Firestone's August 2000 recall, Congress held
hearings to investigate the events that precipitated the tire recall
and to consider passing legislation amending the Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966.2 After hearing testimony from senior executives of
Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone,' safety experts, and consumer
14. Id.
15. Joann Muller et al., Ford: Why It's Worse than You Think, BUS. WK.,
June 25, 2001, at 80.
16. Keith Bradsher, Ford Intends to Replace 13 Million Firestone
Wilderness Tires, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at C1. Ford will replace all
Firestone Wilderness AT tires, in fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen-inch sizes, on
all Ford products, as well as all Wilderness tires purchased as replacement
tires. Id. "Ford will pay up to $110 per fifteen and sixteen-inch tire and $130
per seventeen-inch tire." Id. Ford "said it would take an after-tax write-off
against earnings of $2.1 billion to cover the expense of the recall." Id.
17. BFS Settlement, supra note 11, at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 106-423, at 2-3 (2000).
23. Bridgestone is the Japanese parent company of Firestone. See Chris
Isidore,
Tire
Recall
Woes
Continue,
at
http://money.cnn.com/2000/08/22/news/ford/ (Aug. 22, 2000) (explaining the

relationship between Bridgestone and Firestone). Firestone is Bridgestone's
unit for tire manufacturing and sales in the Americas. Firestone brand tires
account for approximately seventy percent of Bridgestone's sales in the United
States, whereas Bridgestone brand tires account for the remaining thirty
percent. James B. Treece, Firestone Tire Recall Punctures Bridgestone'sProfit,
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advocates, Congress became convinced that a number of existing
legal gaps contributed to the Ford-Firestone situation. By October
20, 2000, a bill designed to fill these gaps was presented to
President Clinton, who signed the TREAD Act into law on
November 1, 2000.24 At the heart of the TREAD Act is a host of
reporting requirements: (1) overseas recalls; (2) "early warning"
information; and (3) sales of defective or noncompliant tires. The
new reporting requirements are buttressed by sharpened civil
penalties and newly added criminal penalties."
B. Impact of the Ford-FirestoneRecall
Aside from congressional reaction to Ford and Firestone's
handling of the tire recall (i.e., passage of the TREAD Act)-which
is the main focus of this article-it is important also to consider
other consequences of the recall. As part of the "Background," this
sub-section briefly assesses five other major consequences: (1)
financial impact of the recall and ensuing litigation; (2) federal
criminal indictments; (3) investigations by state attorneys general;
(4) international responses; and (5) severed relationships.
1.

FinancialImpact

One of most dramatic consequences of the Ford-Firestone
recalls is the financial impact on both companies. In addition to a
drop in sales of the Ford Explorer and Firestone brand tires, the
financial impact can be measured by (1) the cost of implementing
the recalls and defending or settling ensuing litigation; (2) the cost
of compensating victims who either died or were seriously injured
as a result of the accidents; and (3) the cost of lost jobs from
Firestone's decision to close a key plant that manufactured
Wilderness AT tires.
First, the cost of implementing the recalls and defending (or
settling) ensuing litigation
costs is simply staggering.
Implementing the August 2000 recall of 6.5 million tires cost
Firestone more than $1.1 billion. 26 Ford spent $3.3 billion on its
own tire recall (conducted in May 2001),27 which is the largest
product recall in automotive history. 28 This recall consisted of the
replacement of 13 million of the Firestone Wilderness AT tires
that were not subject to the initial recall, and included 1.5 million
tires that were mounted on the vehicles as replacements during
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 8.
24. TREAD, Pub L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800.
25. See McDonald, Don't Tread on Me, supra note 4, at 1187.
26. Alejandro Bodipo-Memba, Tires Plague Ford Again; Recall to Affect
Expedition and Navigator SUVs, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 20, 2002. In October
2000, Firestone replaced 3.5 million more tires (Wilderness AT tires). Id.
27. Id.
28. See Muller et al., supra note 15, at 80.
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the initial Firestone recall.29 Obtaining precise dollar amounts on
the Ford-Firestone rollover litigation is more difficult because
many lawsuits are settled on a confidential basis and companies
(such as Ford) do not disclose these figures. 30 That being said, one
California plaintiff lawyer estimates that Ford has settled about
1,500 Explorer cases.31 According to Ford's annual report, Ford
defended Ford-Firestone related personal injury and class action
lawsuits totaling over $590 million. 2 Firestone set aside $800
million to pay for lawsuits involving the recalled tires.33 In 2000,
Firestone was served "with at least 413 individual lawsuits filed in
state and federal courts ...
seeking recovery for personal
injuries."3 4' As of July 23, 2001, Firestone had already settled 200
claims and lawsuits. 35 By July 2002, Firestone and Ford had
reached undisclosed settlements in more than 600 cases. 6 By late
2003, the number of lawsuits that Firestone settled had ballooned
to more than 1,300."7 The document depository that Firestone
established in Akron, Ohio, in order to respond to discovery
requests eventually grew to about one million pages of
documents. 8 On March 12, 2004, a Texas court approved the
settlement of thirty class action lawsuits under which Firestone

29. Bradsher, supra note 16. See also supra note 16.
30. Eric Mayne, Explorer Verdicts Go Ford's Way, DET. NEWS, Jan. 26,
2004, at 1A. "Ford won't disclose how many lawsuits it has been forced to
defend because of defect allegations leveled against the Explorer." Id.
31. Id. Notably, as of January 2004, Ford had successfully defended the
Explorer in ten consecutive jury trials. Id. Further, Ford claims never to have
lost a jury verdict in an Explorer case on a design issue. Id.
32. 2000 FORD MOTOR CO. ANN. REP. 72. Recently, Ford won a dismissal of
a class action lawsuit filed by Ford stockholders who claimed the company
misled them about the safety of Firestone tires on Ford Explorers by, inter
alia, issuing false financial statements by failing to disclose possible liability of
all related lawsuits and recalls. See David Shepardson, Court Upholds
Dismissal of Ford Tire Safety Suit; Shareholders Claimed They Were Misled
About Explorer Woes, DET. NEWS, Aug. 24, 2004, at 1C.
33. Peter Landers & Todd Zaun, Bridgestone Takes Gamble in Ford Case,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2001, at A21.
34. BFS Settlement, supra note 11, at 14 n.3.
35. Stephen Power & Clare Ansberry, Firestone Girds for Battle Against
Bigger Recall, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2001, at A2. See also NHTSA Updates
Databaseto 174 Deaths; 6,000 Complaints Linked to Firestone Tires, PRODUCT
SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., Feb. 12, 2001, at 174. Personal injury lawyer Tab
Turner from Little Rock, Arkansas, has filed 174 suits against Ford and
Firestone in state courts nationwide. Id. See Joseph B. White et al., Agency to
Comment on Ford Tire Safety, While Inquiry Into Explorer is Considered,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2001, at A3.
36. Myron Levin, California; Ford, Bridgestone Settle Case Just Before
Trial, L.A. TIMEs, July 17, 2002, at 2.
37. See Firestone, Ford Settle Foreign Accident Cases, AUTOMOTIVE LITIG.
REP., Nov. 4, 2003, at 1.
38. BFS Settlement, supra note 11, at 34-35.
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agreed to pay $149 million: 9 (1) $70 million to replace any of the
Wilderness ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires that may still be
on the road; (2) $41.4 million to manufacture certain tires with
better high-speed capacity; 4 (3) $19 million in legal fees; (4) $15.5
million for a consumer awareness campaign about tire safety
("Firestone Consumer Education Program" ("FCEP"));41 and (5)
$2,500 to each of the forty-five plaintiffs.42
Second, the human and economic cost of lives lost in rollover
accidents involving Ford-Firestone has never been estimated,
though such costs are very real. Accidents involving Firestone tires
(mostly involving Explorer rollovers) caused between 2714 and
476" deaths and around 800 injuries in the United States alone;"
ten of these deaths are linked to tires that are among the 10-13
million tires Ford began to replace in the May 2001 round of
recalls.'
In addition to the deaths and injuries in the United
States, dozens of people died in overseas markets, including
47
seventy-nine who either died or were injured in Venezuela.
39. Judge OKs Deals for Firestone Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at
C7; Miles Moore, BFS Gets Good News on 2 Class Action Cases, RUBBER &
PLASTICS NEWS, Mar. 22, 2004, at 3 [hereinafter Moore, Good News].
40. Specifically, Firestone is obligated from January 1, 2004 through
December 31, 2010, "to manufacture certain specified tires designed for
passenger highway or off-road use with designs that include cap belts/strips,
nylon belts/strips, or other comparable technology intended to provide
equivalent or better high-speed capability for such tires." BFS Settlement,
supra note 11, at 6.
41. Id.
Under the FCEP, Firestone is required to spend $5,150,000
annually for three years on activities that increase consumer awareness
"about tire safety and maintenance, vehicle safety and maintenance, and/or
driving safety." Id. Firestone will also change and improve its Tiresafety.com
website and sponsor other programs and events to encourage the improvement
of tire safety. Id. at 17.
42. Judge OKs Deals for Firestone Lawsuits, supra note 39; Moore, Good
News, supra note 39, at 3.
43. Jeff Plungis, Auto Firms Rush to Share Crash Data; New FederalLaw
to Track, Report Complaints, Injuries, Deaths Hits Broad Reach of Companies,
DET. NEWS, Sept. 14, 2003, at 1D [hereinafter Plungis, Auto Firms Rush].
44. See Joseph Szczesny, Carmakers' Tire Warranties Vary, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 2002, at 3 (linking Firestone Wilderness AT tires to 476 deaths in
accidents "mostly involving Ford Explorers"). Author Adam Penenberg places
the number of deaths at 300. ADAM L. PENENBERG, TRAGIC INDIFFERENCE:
ONE MAN'S BATTLE WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY OVER THE DANGERS OF SUVS
299 (2003).
45. Plungis, Auto Firms Rush, supra note 43.
46. Jeff Plungis & Mark Truby, Feds Launch Explorer Inquiry: Rollover
Dataon Ford's Star SUV to be Studied, DET. NEWS, June 20, 2001, at 1A. See
also White et al., supra note 35. Through February 6, 2001, NHTSA has
received over 6,000 complaints relating to the Firestone tires. To see the
NHTSA's report, visit httpJ/www.nhtsa.gov/hotfirestone/update.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2004). Many of these complaints involve tire tread separation
or blowout that led to a vehicle rollover. Id.
47. Ford, Bridgestone Reach Settlement for 90 Lawsuits for Rollovers in
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Third, many workers lost their jobs as a result of the recalls.'
Bridgestone/Firestone announced on June 27, 2001 that it was
closing the Decatur, Illinois tire plant, which had employed 1,500
workers49 and was linked to numerous quality problems.'
Firestone lost approximately $210 million for costs tied to closing
the plant.' Although the Department of Transportation ("DOT")
press statement did not specifically identify which Firestone tires
would need to be recalled, the Wall Street Journal reports
identified the "tires in question [as] "Wilderness AT tires in two
sizes and from certain plants."52 This includes the sixteen-inch
tires manufactured in the Decatur plant.
In sum, the recall and related costs for Ford and Firestone
were staggering. In 2001, Firestone lost $530 million;u its parent
company, Bridgestone, lost $1.67 billion.' Another effect of the
recalls was to drop Firestone's market capitalization by fifty
percent.5
The resulting restructuring of Firestone cost
Bridgestone about $2 billion.' Ford fared no better. In 2001, Ford
lost a record $5.5 billion.57
2. Federal CriminalIndictments
In addition to the severe financial costs noted above, Ford and
Firestone are currently facing federal criminal indictments. Both
Ford and Firestone are being investigated by a federal grand jury
that could deliver criminal indictments for the fatal vehicle
South America, at http://www.afxnews.com (Oct. 24, 2003).
48. David Barboza, Bridgestone/Firestoneto Close Tire Plant at Center of
Huge Recall, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at Cl. "About 1,500 employees,
mostly union workers and many with more than 20 years of experience, will
probably lose their jobs." Id. Firestone insists the decision to close the factory
was made solely on the basis of economics. Id.
49. See Penenberg, supra note 44, at 298.
50. See FirestoneSays Defects Plus Other FactorsCause Increase Tire Tread
Problems, PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., Jan. 1, 2001, at 17. "Decatur is
one of six Bridgestone/Firestone plants in North America that make passenger
and light truck tires." Jennifer Dixon, Troubled Tire Plant to Be Closed, DET.
FREE PRESS, June 28, 2001, at Al. The Decatur plant produces many
different lines of tires. Id. Several are for light trucks, specifically Ford's
Explorer. Id.
51. Barboza, supra note 48. See generally supra note 48.
52. Power & Ansberry, supra note 35.
53. Dixon, supra note 50.
54. Lindsay Chappell, Bridgestone Boss Lampe to Retire, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004, http://www.autonews.com/printStory.cms?newsld=7498.
In 2002, Bridgestone earned $83 million in net profits. Id.
55. Labor Strife Recipe for Trouble, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Jan. 11,
2004, at C-2.
56. Chappell, supra note 54.
57. Jamie Butters, 7,000 Jobs Cut During Ford '03 Downsizing;Automaker
Says It Is on Track in Plan to Earn $2 Billion in '04, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan.
10, 2004, at 1A.
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crashes blamed on faulty tires." "Alan Hogan, who worked on a
Firestone assembly line in Wilson, North Carolina, from 1991 to
1997, told the grand jury his employers [Firestone] forced him and
his co-workers to make tires with steel belts that had lost their
adhesion with age," according to his attorney." As of this writing,
the grand jury is still investigating.
3. State Investigations

While the federal grand jury continues deliberating, state
attorneys general have already settled with both companies. Late
in 2002, Ford agreed to settle lawsuits brought by state attorneys
general alleging that Ford violated state laws against false and
misleading advertising by failing to inform or warn consumers
about rollover dangers of sport-utility vehicles. ° The settlement
between Ford and the state attorneys general from the fifty states,
Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands required
Ford to do the following: (1) pay $51 million; (2) include a
disclaimer in future advertising that shows aggressive driving;6
and (3) fund consumer education initiatives concerning all sportutility vehicles, even non-Ford sport-utilities. The majority of the
settlement-thirty million dollars-will be used to fund a
nationwide "public service advertising campaign" about the safety
of SUVs.Y In addition, each state in the agreement will receive
$300,000, as well as an additional $1 million each to Illinois,
Florida, Iowa, Georgia, Washington, Connecticut, Tennessee, and
Texas to pay for their investigations.' In 2001, Firestone settled
with the state attorneys general on similar grounds for $41.5
million.'
4. InternationalConsequences

The international consequences of the Ford-Firestone matter
break down into two main categories: the foreign governmental
reaction and the foreign victim reaction.
Perhaps because
58. Grand Jury Probes Bridgestone Tires; Ford Explorer Cases Targeted,
CHI.TRIB., Feb. 27, 2003, at 3N.
59. Susan Skiles Luke, Grand Jury Considers First Criminal Charges

Against Ford, Bridgestone/Firestone in Tire Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Feb. 27, 2003.

60. See, e.g., Grace Aduroja, $51 Million SUV Safety Claims Bill for Ford,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2002, at 1N (explaining the amounts that Ford had to
pay); Lack of SUV Rollover Warnings in Ads Forces Ford to Pay $51 Million,
HIGHWAY & VEHICLE / SAFETY REP., Jan. 20, 2003, at 3.

61. Lack of SUV Rollover Warnings in Ads Forces Ford to Pay $51 Million,
supra note 60, at 3. The disclaimer will read: "Professional driver. Closed

Course. Do not attempt." Id.
62. Aduroja, supra note 60, at 1N.

63. Id.
64. Id.
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Firestone tire separations also occurred in overseas markets, such
as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Colombia, Thailand, and Mexico,
some foreign governments looked closely at how the U.S.
government responded as a guide to how to respond in their
markets. One example of legislation similar to TREAD was the
Chinese response, known as the "Stipulation on the Recall of
Defective Automotive Products."' The legislation as drafted would
require required manufacturers to "organize and carry out [a]
recall action" once the existence of [a] defect has been identified.'
Victims in overseas markets have attempted to have their
claims against Ford and Firestone heard in U.S. courts. For
example, thirty-one lawsuits by Mexican nationals were heard in a
Tennessee state court for injuries they sustained in Mexico as a
result of alleged defective Firestone tires on Ford Explorers.67 In
each case, the vehicles and tires were purchased and serviced
exclusively in Mexico, the medical treatment and the
investigations occasioned by the accidents were conducted in
Mexico, and all witnesses of the accidents reside in Mexico.r The
plaintiffs, all of whom are citizens and residents of Mexico,
asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of the
Tennessee "Consumer Protection Act," and civil conspiracy
(alleging "Ford and Firestone conspired to conceal the defective
nature of their products"). 9
Firestone is headquartered in
Tennessee."0 The court of appeals found under principles of forum
non conveniens that Mexico, not Tennessee, is the proper venue to
try these cases.7' Had the decision of the lower court been
sustained, the implications would have been obvious: foreign
nationals would bring their product liability lawsuits in U.S. state
courts."
As of this writing, this case was on appeal to the

65. Stipulation on the Recall of Defective Automotive Products, Draft for
Review (May 2003) (photocopy on file with author) [hereinafter Stipulation].
See
also China Drafts Rules
on Auto
Recall System, at

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200210/25/eng20021025_105656.shtml
updated Oct. 25, 2002).

(last

66. Stipulation, supra note 65, at art. 4.
67. In re: Bridgestone/Firestone & Ford Motor Co. Tire Litig., No. M200202204-COA-R10-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3,

2003).
68. Id. at *2-3.
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id.

Firestone's principle place of business is Davidson County,

Tennessee. Id.
71. Id. at *21.
72. Foreign nationals have successfully used the Alien Tort Claims Act to
sue for violations of international law. See generally Kevin M. McDonald,
Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for Violations
of Customary International Law During the Third Reich, 1997 ST. LOUISWARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167, 171-96 (1997).
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Tennessee Supreme Court.73
Regardless of how this case ends, Ford and Firestone have
already settled at least ninety lawsuits in Venezuela, Costa Rica,
Columbia, and Argentina on claims of tread separations. 4 These
cases were part of the more than 600 cases that were consolidated
before the federal district court in Indianapolis. 5 According to
Bridgestone/Firestone, "the vast majority of these lawsuits have
been resolved through settlements, dismissals, and other
dispositions." 6
5.

Severed Relations

One of the most extraordinary events surrounding the recall
since passage of the TREAD Act was Firestone's announcement on
May 22, 2001 that it would stop selling certain tires to Ford. As
dramatic as the announcement may seem, Ford and Firestone had
not worked well together since the initial recall was announced on
August 9, 2000. Ford accused Firestone of ignoring data that
indicated higher than usual failure rates for the unrecalled
Wilderness tires. Firestone accused Ford of questioning the safety
of Firestone tires to divert attention from steering problems with
the Explorer. John T. Lampe, Firestone's CEO at the time,7 told
73. The decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals contradicts a decision
from the 7th Circuit, in which the court held that 121 of the cases originally
filed in that jurisdiction by Venezuelan and Columbian nationals could not be
dismissed on the basis of a motion for forum non conveniens because a court
must consider whether an adequate alternative forum is available and
whether private and public interest indicate that the alternative forum is
superior. The trial court had used its discretion to credit an expert opinion
that the Venezuelan courts would lack subject-matter jurisdiction, and to
conclude that neither private nor public interest indicated superiority of
alternative forums. In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. Nov. 13,
2002).
74. Company News; Ford and Firestone Settle 90 Suits in Rollover Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2003, at C5; Miles Moore, BFS, Ford Settle 90 Rollover
Suits, RUBBER & PLASTICS NEWS, Nov. 3, 2003, at 4 [hereinafter Moore,
Settle].
75. Moore, Settle, supra note 74.
76. Id.
77. Landers & Zaun, supra note 33. "The cutoff... with Ford applies only
to Firestone tires sold for use on new vehicles in North America, Central
America, and South America. Firestone will continue to provide tires to Ford
in Europe and Asia." Id. Firestone estimates that losing Ford as a customer
will cost less than five percent of Firestone revenue, which totals about $7.5
billion. See Richard Truett, BFS, Ford Warm up to Each Other, RUBBER &
PLASTICS NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004; Keith Bradsher, Firestone to Stop Sales to
Ford, Saying It Was Used as Scapegoat, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at Al;
Timothy Aeppel et al., Firestone Quits as Tire Supplier to Ford, WALL ST. J.,
May 22, 2001, at A3.
78. Mr. Lampe has since retired from Bridgestone/Firestone on March 31,
2004. Chappell, supra note 54. See also Bridgestone Americas Chief Retiring,
DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 8, 2004, at 2C (explaining Lampe's decision to retire).
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the New York Times that he ceased doing business with Ford after
a meeting on May 21, 2001 with Carlos Mazzorin, the Ford vice
president for purchasing.9 "When Mr. Mazzorin said Ford would
not share safety data on the Explorer, Mr. Lampe said that he
handed Mr. Mazzorin a letter terminating the companies'
relationship."" The rupture ended a close business relationship
that began in the early 1900s, when Henry Ford first hired Harvey
Firestone's company to make tires for Ford cars.8 Though the
NHTSA ultimately (in 2002) blamed Firestone tires for the
rollovers,82 Firestone-citing a study undertaken by Ohio State
University professor Dennis Guenther-continues to maintain
that over-steering problems in the Explorer steering system make
the vehicle difficult to control during a tire failure.' The rupture
between Ford and Firestone, as well as the public criticism each
company levied on the other, may have confused the public, but
not the trial lawyers.'
Most recently, U-Haul broke its relationship with Ford,
specifically by ceasing the rental of trailers to consumers who
drive Ford Explorers.8 The reason given by U-Haul was that the
costs of defending product
liability lawsuits related to the Explorer
86
had become "excessive."
The constant barrage of negative media reports took its toll
on Firestone and Ford. Even in 2004, several years after the
recalls, the companies' relationship with each other is still
strained. 7 Ultimately, each company decided to change its top
leadership. The first to go was Masatoshi Ono, the CEO of
79. Bradsher, supra note 77.
80. Id.
81. Aeppel et al., supra note 77. Ford was Firestone's largest customer,
representing five percent of Firestone's revenues. Dixon, supra note 50.
Proving the old adage that "time heals all wounds," outgoing Firestone CEO
(John Lampe) has recently indicated that Firestone might become one of
Ford's suppliers again, although no time frame has been publicly set. Truett,
supra note 77.
82, U-Haul Won't Rent to Ford Explorer Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004,
at C4 [hereinafter U-Haul]. "In 2002, the [NHTSA] cleared the Explorer after
it found the vehicle no more rollover-prone than other SUVs." Mayne, supra
note 30.
83. See Plungis & Truby, supra note 46, at 1A. Firestone also claims that

Florida accident data suggests that the Explorer rolled over four times more
than comparable SUVs. Id.
84. See Aeppel et al., supra note 77 (quoting personal injury lawyer Mike
Edison, co-lead plaintiffs counsel for more than 200 individual death and
injury cases filed in federal courts nationwide against Ford and Firestone as

saying, "[wie couldn't be in a better situation in any case than to have two
defendants fighting each other").
85. See U-Haul, supra note 82.

86. Id.
87. Eric Mayne, Friction Still Exists Between Ford, Firestone, DET. NEWS,

Feb. 8, 2004, at lB.
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Bridgestone/Firestone, who resigned upon the request of
Bridgestone President Yoichiro Kaizaki.'
Bridgestone replaced
not only Mr. Ono, but also Firestone's entire top management
team. Ford held onto Mr. Nasser a bit longer, but the winds of
change blew into Dearborn by late fall 2001. On October 30, 2001,
Ford fired Jacques Nasser as President and CEO, though it denied
that the firing had anything to do with the Firestone recall.89
Interestingly, Mr. Nasser spends part of his time now as a
business professor.'
6. Summary
Both Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford are continuing to
recover from the controversial recalls of 2000.
Bridgestone
responded to the recalls by (1) reorganizing its U.S. operations, (2)
putting greater emphasis on Bridgestone as its premium brand,
and (3) shifting sales away from vehicle manufacturers toward the
consumer market, where profit margins are more favorable.9 The
strategy seems to be working. By 2002, gross margins on U.S. tire
sales grew by seven percent; sales in the United States recovered
from lower levels in 2001; and full-year profits were around $50
million.' On the Ford side, within two years of the recalls, Ford
sold over 51,000 Explorer models in August 2002 in the United
States, which represented the best sales month ever for the
Explorer.93 Less than a year after the recalls, a study in 2001

88. See Bridgestone President to Quit in March; Tire Recall Marred
Kaizaki's Tenure, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at E3. Mr. Ono was replaced by
John T. Lampe. See David Welch, Meet the New Face of Firestone, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 30, 2001, at 64 (providing background on Mr. Lampe). Mr. Lampe retired
in March 2004 and was replaced by Mark Emkes. Bridgestone Americas Chief
Retiring,supra note 78.
89. Ford replaced Mr. Nasser with William Clay Ford, Jr., the greatgrandson of Henry Ford. Danny Hakim, Ford Family Takes the Helm; Effort
to Overcome Rift at Troubled Company, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at C1. Mr.
Ford said that Mr. Nasser's handling of the Firestone recall played no role in
the forced resignation. Id. Because of (or despite) his handling of the FordFirestone recall, Ford paid Mr. Nasser $12.1 million for his services in 2000,
which represented a nineteen percent increase over his 1999 salary. Norihiko
Shirouzu, Ford Paid Its CEO Nasser $12.1 Million in 2000, Up 19% Despite
Tire Problem, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2001, at A8.
90. Luke Collins, Out But Not Down, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 11, 2003,
at 34. Since his firing from Ford, Mr. Nasser has become a member of the
international advisory board of Allianz AG, and a senior partner of One Equity
Partners, which is the private equity business of Bank One Corporation. Id.
In addition, Nasser also lectures at INSEAD, the business school based in
Fontainebleau, France, for a few weeks during the year. Id.
91. Ken Belson & Micheline Maynard, A Return to Profitability;Big Recall
Behind It, Tire Maker Regains Its Footing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at Cl.
Consumers pay twice as much for tires as vehicle manufacturers pay. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Mark Truby, Resilient Explorer Rides High Again, DET. NEWS,
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conducted by Polk found that despite the negative media reports
during the recall controversy, the Explorer enjoyed the "secondhighest owner loyalty rate among SUVs," trailing only the Jeep
Grand Cherokee.94 The strong sales figures and loyal customer
base led the Detroit News to conclude "[w]ith the exception of
Tylenol, which rebounded from an ugly package-tampering
controversy, it is nearly unheard of for a consumer product [such
as the Explorer] to pass through a blizzard of negative publicity
and safety questions virtually unscathed."95
C. Post-TREAD Events
1.

DOT Audit of NHTSA

On January 3, 2002, the DOT Office of Inspector General
("IG")' issued an audit report of NHTSA.97 This report audited not
only NHTSA's implementation of the TREAD Act, but also how
NHTSA conducts defects investigations. The IG performed the
audit "at the request of Senator John McCain [R-AZ], Ranking
Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation."9" The careful observer will recall that
Senator McCain had pushed strongly during the Ford-Firestone
hearings for his own bill, which ultimately lost to the House
version.' During the Senate committee's Ford-Firestone hearing
on September 12, 2000, the committee questioned ODI's 1° ability
Sept. 5, 2002, at 1A.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The IG works independently "within the DOT to promote effectiveness
and head off, or stop, waste, fraud and abuse in departmental programs...
through audits and investigations." Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen.,
Background and Responsibility, at http://www.oig.dot.gov/about.php (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004). The current Inspector General of the DOT is Kenneth
M. Mead, who has served in this position since his confirmation by the U.S.
Senate on May 27, 1997. See Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen.,
Kenneth Mead, at http://www.oig.dot.gov/emp-bio.php?id=253 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2004) (providing a biography of Mead).
97. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF
DEFECTS INVESTIGATION (2002) [hereinafter IG REPORT], available at

http://www.oig.dot.gov/showpdf.php?id=662.
In comparison with media
coverage of the underlying events that triggered the TREAD Act, media
coverage of this report was scant and superficial. See, e.g., Jayne O'Donnell,
Report: Auto Defects Still Slipping by NHTSA, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2002, at
3B; Caroline E. Mayer, Highway Safety Agency Faulted on Probes; Internal
Study Calls NHTSA System for Collecting Data 'Seriously Flawed,' WASH.
POST, Jan. 10, 2002, at E02.
98. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at Memo 1 (incorporating a memorandum
from Alexis M. Stefani to the NHTSA).
99. See McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, supra note 4, at 1180.
100. ODI is the abbreviation for "Office of Defects Investigation," which is
the arm of NHTSA that is responsible for conducting investigations in order to
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to handle information that could contain early warning signs of
product defects, 1 ' because ODI had on file twenty-five consumer
complaints as well as notifications from State Farm officials
warning of Firestone tire problems that went back several years
1 02
before ODI ever opened a preliminary evaluation into the matter.
In auditing NHTSA, the IG's objectives (as specifically
requested by Senator McCain' °3) were the following:
(1) evaluate NHTSA's progress and challenges in implementing the
TREAD Act; (2) assess the adequacy of NHTSA's processes and
procedures for assessing potential defects and opening
investigations; (3) evaluate the risks associated with NHTSA's
approach for developing a new defect information management
system (DIMS); and (4) identify notification, investigation, and
recall requirements considered as 'best practices' by other
regulatory
agencies that may be used as models for improving
14
0

ODI.

This
Section
discusses
the
IG's
findings
and
recommendations, NHTSA's response to the IG, and the IG's
counter-response to NHTSA.
a. NHTSA's Progress and Challenges in Implementing the
TREAD Act
The IG's first objective in auditing NHTSA was to examine
how effective NHTSA was (or was not) in implementing the
TREAD Act. Of the fifteen rulemakings mandated under TREAD,
Congress laced eight with rather tight statutory deadlines,
ranging from only a year to just over eighteen months."0 Usually,
the DOT requires 3.8 years to complete significant rules, which is
well over double the time envisaged in TREAD."° In its zeal to
force additional regulation in record time, Congress appears to
have ignored, or at least failed to appreciate, the necessary checks
and balances of the regulatory process.
These checks and
implement the Vehicle Safety Act by identifying and correcting safety-related
defects in vehicles and vehicle equipment. See 49 C.F.R. § 554.5. See also
Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 1302, 1313-17 (2002) [hereinafter McDonald, Judicial Review]
(providing further background on ODI).
101. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at i.
102. McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, supra note 4, at 1173, 1176.
Unfortunately, ODI's apparent oversight of this early data was mainly
overlooked by Congress, which chose to focus almost entirely on the conduct of

Ford and Firestone. Had Congress studied this matter more thoroughly, it
would have found that NHTSA had plenty of "early warning data" by which to
order a recall months, if not years, before NHTSA ever even opened a
preliminary evaluation.
103. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 27.
104. Id. at i.
105. TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 14 Stat. 1800 (2002).

106. Id.
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balances, which may "slow down" the regulatory process and
result in the 3.8-year average to complete significant rules,
include: (1) the need for agencies to consider differing views on the
substance of the proposed rule; (2) requirements for a cost/benefit
analysis; and (3) the need to have other entities, such as the Office
of Management and Budget ("OMB"), review and approve a
proposed rule. °7
Not surprisingly, the IG found that NHTSA faced substantial
challenges in meeting TREAD's statutory deadlines.'
Although
NHTSA had already issued nine proposed rules and three final
rules by the time of the report (January 3, 2002),"9 it had already
missed the statutory deadline of November 1, 2001 for the final
rule regarding the tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS)."'
To minimize the risk of NHTSA not completing a number of
rulemakings in the time mandated in the TREAD Act, the IG
recommended that NHTSA consult with DOT and begin routinely
informing Congress of the milestone dates, budget estimates, and
actions required to complete the rulemakings (consulting with
OMB where needed)."'
NHTSA concurred with this
recommendation,"' although NHTSA said it would brief
congressional committee staff as opposed to the full Congress on
the status of TREAD implementation and provide additional
information when specifically requested by Congress."'
b. Adequacy of NHTSA's Processes and Procedures for Assessing
Defects
The IG's second objective in auditing NHTSA was to examine
ODI's current defect analysis and investigative processes."' In
short, the IG found that ODI's processes "are in need of major
improvements""' because of three major shortcomings: (1)
defective processes; (2) limited information range; and (3) a
problematic defect database." 6
The first process shortcoming identified by the IG was the
ODI process for analyzing defect trend data. 7 Generally speaking,
the ODI process reflected "an unstructured approach for analyzing
107. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at vi.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 21.

112. See id. at 36 (providing the Memorandum from Jeffrey W. Runge to
Thomas J. Howard, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Maritime and
Highway Safety Programs, dated December 4, 2001).
113. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 23.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at i.
Id. at vi.
Id.
Id.
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data and determining if a potential defect exists and warrants
further investigation." "8 Specifically, ODI's process provided no
methodology for analyzing consumer complaints. "9 For instance,
ODI procedures do not inform staff how to undertake a sufficient
search of the available consumer complaint data or even how to
study the data to identify defect trends.20 Further, in contrast to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),"2' ODI staff is
not required to notify senior management when they receive
complaints that involve a serious injury.'22 Perhaps most troubling
to the IG was that ODI, according to NHTSA's own Associate
Administrator for Safety Assurance, does not even have "specific
processes or procedures for opening [defect] investigations. "1"
Rather, ODI opens investigations "based on the seriousness and
frequency of the complaint(s).""'
ODI's failure to prioritize
investigations leads to troubling inconsistencies, as the IG noted
in the following observation:
[Olver a 4-month period, ODI received three complaints alleging
front suspension torsion bar breakage in 1993-94 minivans, that
could cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle and increase the
risk of a crash; however, no investigation was opened. In contrast,
another case had three complaints with no reports of crashes over a
1-year period alleging front suspension coil spring breakage that
could pose a potential compromise to the driver's
ability to control
25
the vehicle, and ODI opened an investigation.
To fix ODI's process inconsistencies, the IG recommended
that NHTSA establish a peer review panel1 21 so as to "bring
management together to identify high priority cases and to ensure
a degree of consistency in the decision making process." "' A peer
review "can be effectively used to provide a thorough and
consistent assessment of the quality of ODI's support for
recommending and opening an investigation" while offering the
benefit of providing an effective mechanism "for answering

118. Id.
119. Id. at vi
120. Id.
121. See infra notes 160, 171 and accompanying text. The CPSC is an
Independent Federal Regulatory Agency.
U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2004). It works to keep consumers safe "by reducing the
risk of injuries and deaths associated with consumer products." Id.
122. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at vi.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at vii-viii.
126. Id. at viii. The panel would be made up of the Chiefs of the Defects
Analysis and Investigations Divisions and staff members of those divisions.

Id.
127. Id. at viii.
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questions such as how data supporting the opening of an
investigation compare to the data in a similar case that was
investigated."'28 Additionally, the IG recommended that ODI
"develop new defect analysis and investigative processes that
define parameters for analyzing data and opening investigations"
129
as well as providing corresponding training to the staff.
The second process shortcoming identified by the IG was the
limited range of information utilized by ODI in gathering defect
information.'
Specifically, ODI fails to solicit "internal and
external information sources, such as NHTSA's accident
databases,
insurance companies, and plaintiff attorneys, to
To fix this
determine the scope of a potential defect." 13'
shortcoming, the IG recommended that ODI consult regularly with
additional outside sources of information and "develop innovate
techniques" in collecting and analyzing information "from a wider
range of sources to help identify potential trends sooner.""'
The third process shortcoming identified by the IG was the
ODI's defect database, which is hindered by "the limited amount
and poor quality of data ODI uses to spot defect trends.""34 ODI's
defect database, which ODI uses as its "primary tool" to identify
potential defect trends, "significantly underestimates the number
of potential safety defects.""' The database contains one-tenth the
amount of complaints on file with manufacturers." 6 In addition,
the database contains incomplete and incorrectly recorded
information.1 37
For example, consumer complaints describing
problems with "failed brakes that led to accidents in which airbags
did not deploy" was only recorded as an airbag problem."'
Further, keyword searches yield different results that vary
according to the word used.3 9 For instance, searching under the
word "brake" as opposed to "braking" on the same 1995 minivan
produced radically different results. 40 As a result, "relevant
128. Id. at 16.
129. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at vi.
130. Id. at 12-13.
131. NHTSA databases, such as the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
("FARS") and the National Automotive Sampling System ("NASS"), contain
information on motor vehicle accidents, which could be "useful for identifying
trends by comparing the complaints with accident results." Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 12.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at vi.
135. Id. at viii. The database contains "consumer complaints to NHTSA,
past and ongoing ODI investigations, manufacturer recalls, and manufacturerissued technical service bulletins." Id. at 10.
136. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11.
140. Id. at 11-12.
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complaints and a potential defect trend may not be identified." 1
Finally, ODI staff must process over 34,000 complaints a year,
which comes out to about 200 per week, allowing each staff
member an average of twelve minutes per complaint (per person)
"to review the information and search the defect database for
similar complaints, related investigations and recalls" and decide
whether to recommend an investigation.14 2 With the additional
manpower provided for under TREAD, this situation should

improve. 143
In NHTSA's response to the IG's recommendations for
improving ODI processes, NHTSA maintained that ODI
procedures "have worked well"'" (a point in turn strongly refuted
by the IG, which cited the Firestone case as "clearly illustrat[ing]
that ODI's processes and procedures need major improvements"4 ),
but agreed to: (1) develop and formalize new defect analysis and
case opening procedures used by the ODI screeners in the Defect
and Recall Information and Analysis Division and train personnel
in these new procedures; 1 (2) a peer review panel made of the
"Division Chiefs and selected staff investigators that would review
the
screeners'
recommendations
for
opening
defect
investigations;" 147 and (3) identify techniques for collecting and
analyzing defect information from a wide range of sources.'"
c. Risk Evaluation of NHTSA's New Defect Information
Management System
The IG's third objective in auditing NHTSA was to "evaluate
the risks associated with NHTSA's approach for developing a new
defect information management system" (DIMS). 1'9 An efficient
and accurate DIMS is particularly important considering the
amount of data NHTSA will receive from manufacturers under the
new early warning reporting ("EWR") requirement."
For this
reason, the IG recommended that NHTSA "develop a new [DIMS]
to replace the currently flawed system.. . because the success of

141. Id. at 12.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id. ("ODI is planning to hire 18 additional staff - a 39 percent increase
in staff. ODI intends to hire four defects analysis staff, seven investigators,
one statistician, two data entry and control staff, and four administrative
staff. ODI has hired four defects analysis staff, three investigators, and three
administrative staff.")
144. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 37.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 38.
147. Id. NHTSA stated that this process commenced with the first panel
meeting on November 29, 2001. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at i.
150. See infra notes 207-221 and accompanying text.
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the TREAD Act depends on the quality and usefulness of the new
information system and ODI's ability to identify potential
defects." 5' To ensure that the new DIMS functions properly, the
IG recommended
that NHTSA have
"an independent
assessment... to ensure that [the system]... meets quality, cost,
and schedule goals." 5' As correctly identified by the IG, the
"success of the TREAD Act will ultimately rise or fall on the
quality and usefulness of the new information system and ODI's
ability to identify potential defects."'53
The new system replaced the then-current defect database
with a new information system by the fall of 2002. The new
system, which is designed to process the early warning
information submitted by manufacturers on a quarterly basis
(such as warranty data and customer complaint data on every
vehicle sold), is "at risk because of poor project planning and
management,"" according to the IG, which doubted NHTSA's
ability to have the off-the-shelf $5 million system from Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) fully operational
by fall 2002. (In testimony to Congress, the IG noted that the
software (even if "off-the-shelf') will need modifications and
The IG claims an
"involve systems development work")."'
independent assessment of NHTSA's plan could help it "spot
problems before they result in major cost increases and schedule
slippages."" In its response, NHTSA did not agree with the IG's
draft recommendations to assign a full-time project manager to
the new information system project."7 The IG dropped this draft
recommendation, however, because NHTSA did agree to "obtain
the services of an independent entity to validate and verify the
contractor's [i.e., Volpe's] progress" and reduce development risk."
d.

"Best Practices" of Other Regulatory Agencies

The IG's fourth (and last) objective in auditing NHTSA was to
"identify notification, investigation and recall requirements
considered as 'best practices' by other regulatory agencies and that
may be used as models for improving ODI."' In looking for
151. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at ii.
152. Id. at iv.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Hearing,supra note 2, at 2, iv, 5.
156. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at v.

157. Id. at 39. "NHTSA does not agree that it would be beneficial to hire a
'full-time project manager,' particularly at this point in the project." Id.
NHTSA has the Chief of the Information Management Division of the Office of
Safety Assurance as the project manager "responsible for assuring that ODI's
needs are met in a proper and timely manner." Id.
158. Id. at 25, 39.
159. Id. at i.

Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

20041

1093

examples of better investigative practices, the IG looked at similar
federal agencies and decided the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) provided the best model." The IG noted that
the CPSC "employs several methods" that ODI could use "to
identify defects, prioritize investigations, publicize recalls, and
involve senior management in the decision making process."'6 1
The IG explains that:
First, the CPSC draws on multiple "sources of information
and databases to detect safety-related problems in products.' 62
Sources include coroners, fire departments, hospitals, field data
collected by investigators, and compliance data on manufacturer
actions. 6
Second, the CPSC prioritizes investigations and recalls based
on the severity of the hazard. 6 The prioritization is based on
criteria that "include the severity of the risk, the intended or
foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population group
exposed to the products including children, the elderly, and the
handicapped. " "
A hazard priority system also assists in
developing the corrective action. For example, a Class A hazard
(the highest priority) represents "product defects that present a
strong likelihood of death or grievous injury" and therefore
'
justifies the highest level of manufacturer and CPSC attention. 6
Third, corrective actions and notifications of defects are
developed by both the CPSC and the manufacturer.161 Although
the CPSC develops the wording of the press release, the press
release is ultimately issued jointly with the manufacturer."
Manufacturers might have to employ other methods to make the
recall public, such as "television announcements, recall posters in
stores that
sold the defective
product, and website
announcements."6
Fourth, CPSC commissioners meet weekly with senior
compliance managers to discuss the status of investigations and
emerging
hazards
data. '
Commissioners
are informed
immediately of complaints or notices that deal with a "death or
risk of serious injury. " '

160. See id. at 20 (finding that the "scope and extent of CPSC's regulatory

authority most closely parallels NHTSA's").
161. Id.
162. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 20.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.

170. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at 21.

171. Id.
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As part of its recommendation that NHTSA "ensure
consistency in recommending and opening investigations and that
highest priority cases" are appropriately investigated, 172 the IG
recommended that NHTSA evaluate these "best practices" and use
them "as appropriate." 73 NHTSA responded that, while
"concurring" in the "appropriateness" of identifying best practices,
it has "previously considered" some of the best practices used by
CPSC in the IG Report and decided "that they would not be
practical in the ODI context," because NHTSA does not, for
example, "have the field staff that the CPSC uses to contact local
coroners and other individuals across the country." 74 The IG
appears to find NHTSA's response incomplete, calling (again) on
NHTSA "to specify how it plans to evaluate the best practices and
which best practices it will use.""'
2.

CongressionalOversight Hearings

On February 28, 2002, the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, which has oversight
authority over NHTSA, 76 held a two-hour hearing entitled
"Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later." According
to Representative Clifford Stearns (R-FL), Chairman of the
Subcommittee, this hearing was designed
to examine "NHTSA's
" 177
implementation of the TREAD Act.
The Subcommittee invited only three witnesses (all
government employees) to testify: (1) Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge,
Administrator of NHTSA; (2) John D. Graham, Ph.D.,
Administrator of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 24.

176. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
which is a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,

has jurisdiction over the following:
1. Interstate and foreign commerce, including all trade matters within

the jurisdiction of the full [House] committee;
2. Regulation of commercial practices (the FTC), including sportsrelated matters;
3. Consumer affairs and consumer protection, including general privacy
matters, consumer product safety (the CPSC), product liability, and
motor vehicle safety; and
4. Regulation of travel, tourism, and time.
The House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Committee Jurisdiction, at

http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/jurisdiction.htm

(last visited Sept. 1,

2004) (emphasis added). Representative Clifford Stearns (R-FL), Chairman of
the subcommittee, believes the subcommittee's oversight jurisdiction over

NHTSA is "one of [the subcommittee's] most important oversight" functions.
Hearing,supra note 2, at 1.

177. Id.
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Affairs (OIRA); and (3) Kenneth M. Mead, DOT's Inspector
General.17
The following eleven legislators attended the hearing: (1)
Subcommittee
Chairman
Clifford
Stearns
(R-FL);
(2)
Subcommittee Ranking Member'79 Edolphus Towns (D-NY); (3)
Full Committee Ranking Member John Dingell (D-MI); 80 (4) Fred
Upton (R-MI); (5) John Shimkus (R-IL); (6) Ed Bryant (R-TN); (7)
Joseph Pitts (R-PA); (8) Charles Bass (R-NH); (9) Diana DeGette
(D-CO); (10) Edward Markey (D-MA); and (11) Thomas Sawyer (DOH). 8 1

The hearing focused on four areas: (1) congressional intent of
the TREAD Act; (2) the forthcoming early warning reporting rule;
(3) the DOT IG's Audit of the ODI; and (4) the tire pressure
monitoring rule.'
a.

Congressional Intent Behind TREAD

The first theme of the hearings was the congressional
sentiment behind TREAD. The lawmakers' prepared statements
(many of which the congressmen read in total before questioning
the witnesses) offer further insight into the congressional intent
behind the TREAD Act. Although some lawmakers addressed
narrow issues of particular relevance to constituencies in their
districts (e.g., addressing concerns of factory employees in tire
manufacturing plants regarding an increased health risk as a
result of proposed requirements of labels on both sides of a tire" ),
some lawmakers emphasized the "big picture" of TREAD.
Perhaps most effective in providing substantive insight into
congressional action was Subcommittee Chairman Clifford
Stearns. In describing why Congress passed the TREAD Act,
178. Id. at iii (Table of Contents).
179. The term "Ranking Member" is used in both the House and the Senate
and refers to the second highest rank (after the Chairperson) on a committee.
C-Span Congressional Glossary, at http://www.c-span.orgguide/congress/
glossary/rankmem.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).

180. By virtue of his position as Ranking Democratic Member of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Representative Dingell serves ex officio
as a member of the subcommittee. See The House Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Subcommittee Members, at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
107/members/ctcpmembers.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (listing the names

of the members).
181. Representative Sawyer is not a member of the subcommittee; however,
he is a member of the Full House Committee on Energy and Commerce. See
The House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Congress Members,
http:lenergycommerce.house.gov/107/members/members.htm
(last visited
Sept. 1, 2004).

182. In his testimony, Dr. Runge noted that completing the TPMS
rulemaking was "one of [his] highest priorities." Hearing, supra note 2, at 15.
A discussion of the TPMS rulemaking is outside the scope of this article.
183. Id. at 33.
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Chairman Stearns explained that "Congress had to act in order to
protect American lives, because in some respects NHTSA had
failed."'"
Additional statements from Chairman Stearns suggest that
the TREAD Act may have been premised on false assumptions.
Chairman Steams claimed that "many of the fatalities and
injuries on American roads arise from vehicle defects."'
This
claim is highly problematic. First, the statement presupposes an
understanding of the term "vehicle defect." Yet, there is no
commonly understood meaning of "vehicle defect." What a
layperson may consider a "defective" automobile part may in fact
be a part that has deteriorated due to either normal wear and tear
or abuse. Vehicle manufacturers and the NHTSA struggle with
this definition on a case-by-case basis, and the determination of
the existence of a defect can often only be made after extensive
technical engineering and legal analysis.
Second, even if one could settle upon an agreed definition of
"vehicle defect," the fact is that the overwhelming majority of
fatalities and injuries on American roads arise not from vehicle
defects, but from driver error: (1) drunk driving; (2) failure to wear
safety belts; (3) failure to observe posted speed limits; and (4)
driver fatigue. In 2000, 41,821 people were killed and 3,189,000
people were injured in vehicle crashes.'
In 2003, vehicle crashes
killed 42,643 people and injured 2.89 million.8 ' According to the
DOT's official figures, "alcohol involvement is the single greatest
factor in motor vehicle deaths and injuries."' Indeed, alcohol was
involved in forty percent of fatal crashes and eight percent of all
crashes.'89 Failure to wear safety belts is also a major contributor
to deaths and injuries. Between forty-one and forty-five percent of
occupants involved in fatal crashes did not wear safety belts.'9 °
NHTSA estimates that if all passenger vehicle occupants over age
four wore safety belts, then 21,127 lives could have been saved in
2000.1
Speeding (i.e., exceeding the posted speed limit, driving
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id.
186. 2000 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 [hereinafter
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000].
187. See Press Release, NHTSA, DOT Announces Historic Low Highway
Fatality
Rate
in
2003
(Aug.
10,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/announce/press/pressdisplay.cfm?year=2004&f
ilename=pr35-04.html.
188. Fed. Highway Admin., General Facts Regarding the Driver, at
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/fourthlevel/brakesfacts.htm
(Oct.
10,
2001)
[hereinafter General Facts].
189. TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000, supra note 186, at 3.
190. Id. at 2. Forty-one percent of passenger car occupants and forty-five
percent of light truck occupants involved in fatal crashes were unrestrained.

Id.
191. Id.
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too fast for conditions (weather, etc.), or racing) is, according to
NHTSA, "one of the most prevalent factors contributing to traffic
crashes." 9 ' Speeding was a contributing factor in twenty-nine
percent of all fatal crashes (12,350 lives).9
Speeding and alcohol
are intertwined as well: forty percent of the intoxicated drivers
(i.e., with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or higher) involved
in fatal crashes were speeding, compared with only thirteen
percent of the sober drivers (blood alcohol concentration of 0.00)
involved in fatal crashes." Driver distraction, from using a cell
phone to smoking, contributes to twenty-five percent of vehicle
crashes.9
Finally, driver fatigue alone causes at least 40,000
fatalities and 5 million injuries a year."
Third, there is simply no reliable data from which to conclude
that vehicle "defects" cause "many fatalities and injuries." NHTSA
itself, which provides the most authoritative and exhaustive
statistical data on vehicle crashes,9 does not even track such data,
perhaps because it recognizes the inherent difficulty involved in
drawing such conclusions from available crash data. The last
major in-depth study into causes of vehicle crashes was conducted
by the Indiana University in 1977.
This study found that vehicle
"factors" (not necessarily defects) were "definite, probable causal or
severity increasing" in a little over twelve percent (plus or minus
three percent) of the 420 crashes studied.' Given the number of
added safety features (e.g., airbags, anti-lock braking systems,
anti-slip regulation, etc.) and product structural improvements
(e.g., stronger front ends to better absorb crashes"9 ) over the
twenty-five years since this study, vehicle "factors" causing
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Press Release, Jane C. Stutts, Ph.D., University of North Carolina
Highway Safety Research Center, Testimony for Presentation at the

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit Hearing on Driver Distractions:
Electronic Devices in the Automobile (May 9, 2001), available at
http'//www.hsrc.unc.edulpressreleaseldistractiontestimony.htm.
Driver
distraction is present when a driver delays in recognizing information that is
necessary to "safely accomplish the driving task," because something either
inside or outside the vehicle draws her attention away from the driving task.
Id. The growing use of cell phones continues to contribute to vehicle crashes.
Though numbers data are hard to find, according to the National Safety
Council, conversing on cell phones leads to "significant decrements in driving
performance." Id.
196. General Facts,supra note 188.
197. See, e.g., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000, supra note 186.
198. Report, J.R. Treat et al., Tri-level Study of the Causes of Traffic
Accidents: Indiana University Final Report to the US DOT (Mar. 1977).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Safety Is Improving Among Small Cars, Crash Tests Show,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2002, at A8 (summarizing crash test results from the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety).

1098

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:1073

crashes are most certainly far less than twelve percent today. A
survey conducted by the Colorado State Patrol (CSP) supports this
assertion. °1 In 2001, the CSP investigated 12,262 vehicle crashes
Vehicle defects were
that involved injuries or fatalities. "°
classified as the cause of the crash in only 2.6% of all crashes,
which is consistent with numbers recently published by the
"Detroit News," in which "vehicle defects" were identified as the
cause of only 3 percent of all highway accidents in 2003.0"
Whether 2.6% (or even 3%) constitutes "many" of the vehicle
crashes is questionable (at best). The word "many" means
"consisting of a great number, numerous, not few."" ° Is 2.6% or
any number less than 2.6% "a great number, numerous, not few?"
The answer is debatable, yet an important distinction must be
made between "many" and "some." In the context of assigning
fault for vehicle crashes, claiming that vehicle defects cause
"many" fatalities and injuries may seem to imply a number that is
more than the actual number, because some people may
understand "many" to mean a majority or at least a number
greater than the actual number. By attributing an overly inflated
number of fatalities and injuries to vehicle defects, one may draw
false conclusions, such as (1) vehicles are inherently unsafe, (2) the
government needs to legislate more "safety" into vehicles, and (3)
other factors, such as driver error, are not as prevalent in vehicle
crashes as in fact such factors are.
Based on all of the above, one must conclude that the
premises underlying the TREAD Act are based on some false
assumptions. Contrary to the impressions left by the
subcommittee, driver error, not vehicle defect, is the leading cause
of death and injury in vehicle crashes. Whether "vehicle defects"
cause "many" fatalities and injuries is also doubtful, because, even
presuming a coherent definition of "vehicle defect," existing data
would not appear to support the Chairman's claim that "many"
vehicle crashes are caused by vehicle defects.0" This criticism is
available
Trends,
Crash
State
Patrol,
201. Colorado
http://csp.state.co.us/Stats/Crash.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).

at

202. Id.
203. Id. See Jeff Plungis, Feds Aim to Curb Auto Crashes, DET. NEWS, July
18, 2004, at 1A (identifying "driver-related factors" as the leading factor in all
highway accidents in 2003 (eighty-nine percent of the accidents), followed by
"unfavorable road surfaces" causing eight percent).
204. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 965 (6th ed. 1990).
205. In a survey conducted by Tire Business, fifty independent tire dealers
were asked how often they encounter tires they would consider "defective."
Nearly seventy-one percent of the dealers taking part in the survey responded
that they "'seldom'encounter a genuine product defect in the tires they
purchase from manufacturers and resell to consumers." Approximately
twenty-six percent said that they "occasionally" encounter tires that are
defective. Chuck Slaybaugh, Dealers Say Many Tires Die from User Neglect,
TIRE Bus., Sept. 22, 2003, at 8.
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more than just semantics, because public policy decisions based on
false assumptions can lead to poor law at an otherwise avoidable
cost to the regulated stakeholders and, ultimately, the voting
public."
b.

Early Warning Reporting Rule

The second theme of the hearings was how NHTSA was
interpreting and implementing the early warning reporting
rulemaking mandate."7 Though Congressman Dingell correctly
noted that NHTSA/ODI was "awash in information""° long before
opening investigations into the Ford-Firestone matter, the
oversight hearing nevertheless seemed to encourage NHTSA to
gather as much information as possible from manufacturers, even
if some of that information is not even a reliable indicator of defect
trends. For reasons discussed (in this subsection) below, the best
example of unreliable information is consumer complaint data.
Nevertheless, the subcommittee clearly indicated a desire that the
early warning reporting rule contain data "from a variety of
2
sources, including.., consumer complaints."
" Dr. Runge, too,
supported the inclusion of "statistical data about consumer
complaints," because "these submissions will help [NHTSA]...
identify potential safety defects in a timely manner, without
unduly burdening the manufacturers." 1 ' After all, according to
Chairman Stearns, if the early warning provisions are
implemented as intended, thousands of lives may be saved. 1'
Chairman Stearns, however, offered no support for this
proposition.
Congress's and NHTSA's desire to include consumer
complaints as part of the early warning rule is misguided for two
main reasons: (1) NHTSA has questionable case law supporting
the inclusion of consumer complaint data; and (2) even if the case
law is read to support the reliability of consumer complaint data
as an indicator of defect trends, the de facto reality is that these
data are highly subjective accounts of symptoms, not objective
reports of technical defects. For both these reasons, NHTSA
should not have included consumer complaint data in the early
206. Law premised on false assumptions for some reason also seems to
generate congressional promises of delivering successes that are vague and
unsupported by empirical evidence. For example, Chairman Stearns claimed
that TREAD "could save hundreds if not thousands of lives" if it is
implemented as Congress envisioned. Hearing, supra note 2, at 2. Yet,
Chairman Stearns offered no specific analysis supporting this assertion.
207. See TREAD, § 3(b). See also McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, supra
note 4, at 1191-94.
208. Hearing,supra note 2, at 5.
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id. at 14.
211. Id. at 2.
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warning rule.
First, in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM"),
NHTSA relies in part on a strained reading of case law to support
the inclusion of consumer complaint data: "the federal courts have
recognized that consumer complaints can be a valuable source of
evidence of the existence of a safety-related defect in motor
vehicles."212 However, such a reading fails to recognize the
difficulty in drawing any conclusions from consumer complaints,
especially when submitted only in raw number form, as required
by NHTSA.
A more precise reading of case law reveals that NHTSAprior to ordering a recall-must demonstrate that failures occur,
not just that consumers complain.213 The reason is that the courts
recognize that consumer complaints often offer little assistance in
identifying safety-related trends because "drivers can describe
only what happened to them, which is an altogether insufficient
basis upon which to make a judgment as to the technical adequacy
of... their cars."2"4 In fact, where NHTSA relies on circumstantial
evidence to establish the existence of a safety-related defect, such
as relying on consumer complaints of skidding to establish
performance failures, then the courts have granted manufacturers
the right to rebut with testing data that undermines the claim
that vehicle malfunction caused the incidents described by the
consumer complaints.215 Such data could show, for example, either
that causes other than vehicle malfunction could cause the
phenomenon that consumers complained about, or that the vehicle
is "no more likely than other [competitive] vehicles to be involved
in such incidents."" 6 However, this type of rebuttal is not included
in the TREAD rulemaking, which mandates the submission of raw
consumer complaint numbers, even if the underlying complaints
have nothing to do with safety-related issues. NHTSA's inclusion
of consumer complaints that do not involve safety, such as
complaints about treatment at the dealership or a perceived
inadequate size of the cup holder, exceeds even the stated purpose
of requiring customer complaints in the first place-as an
indicator of safety-related defect trends.
Second, even if one discounts the case law, the fact remains
that consumer complaints by their very nature usually reflect
merely a subjective observation of a symptom, whereas other data

212. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,190, 66,203
(proposed Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 574, 576, 579).
213. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1555, 1577 (D.D.C.
1987) [hereinafter GM I].
214. Id.
215. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 400, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
216. Id.
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(warranty claims or field reports) are inherently causal (and thus
more reliable as an indicator of a defect trend), such as explaining
why a broken part was replaced or repaired. The following
example clarifies this point: If a consumer complains that her
steering wheel vibrates, NHTSA (or the manufacturer) would
probably record the complaint as a steering problem in its
consumer complaint database. Yet, depending on the cause, the
same problem would likely be recorded (correctly) as a wheel, tire,
or brake problem in the warranty database. To the extent that
both consumer complaint data and warranty data are included in
the final rule, inconsistent reporting will result and "problems"
will appear that are in fact not problems. Add to this inconsistency
the fact that most consumer affairs personnel do not possess the
technical expertise to translate consumer complaints about
symptoms into reliable and accurate component or system codes,
and the result is a prescription for further problems at ODI, which
will waste already stretched resources chasing down red herrings.
Yet, NHTSA could avoid this problem by simply not mandating
dumps of consumer complaint data.
Just because NHTSA relies heavily on consumer complaint
data when deciding whether to open an investigation and
potentially order a recall..7 does not mean that such data are per se
reliable indicators of a potential defect trend. Rather, what this
indicates is what the IG noted in its audit, namely, that NHTSA
fails to adequately consider other sources, such as insurance data,
when studying a potential product defect. Further, as the IG
indicated in its audit report, the NHTSA consumer complaints
database is riddled with inconsistencies and other problems. 8
Finally, the way NHTSA defines "consumer complaint" makes
its value as a reliable early warning indicator highly doubtful. As
will be discussed in detail below (in the context of discussing the
Final Rule on Early Warning), NHTSA has defined "consumer
complaint" so broadly as to remove any nexus to safety-related
defects.1 9
Aside from the scope of the early warning rule, particularly
the inclusion of consumer complaints, the hearings touched briefly
on the issue of cost of complying with the rule. The IG told
Congress that "[siignificant disagreements are likely between
NHTSA and automobile manufacturers over the scope and
parameters of the reporting requirements in the proposed rule."22 °
Specifically, the IG pointed out the industry's concern that NHTSA
217. IG REPORT, supra note 97, at iv. Seventy-five percent of NHTSA defect
investigations are opened on the basis of consumer complaints. Id.
218. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2, at 21 (explaining problems with the
database).
219. See infra notes 320-322 and accompanying text.
220. Hearing,supranote 2, at 23.
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grossly underestimated the burden imposed by the early warning
NPRM, from the resources (staff) to the money needed to comply. 2
c.

DOT Inspector General Audit Report of ODI

The third (final) theme of the hearings was the DOT IG's
Audit Report of ODI."' Dr. Runge explained that the IG Report,
published January 3, 2002, would be submitted by NHTSA to
3
satisfy NHTSA's obligation under TREAD to provide Congress"
with a "comprehensive review... [and] undertake such steps as
may be necessary to update and improve such standards, criteria,
procedures, and methods, including data management and
analysis" used by NHTSA in determining whether to open a defect
or noncompliance investigation. 4 In submitting the IG Report as
NHTSA's own TREAD report, Dr. Runge stated that NHTSA
concurred with all the IG recommendations and had already
implemented many of them, such as establishing a peer review
panel to evaluate potential defects as well as hiring a contractor to
independently review the project of creating the new defect
information management system.
The hearings focused on two of the many IG
recommendations: (1) NHTSA should have an independent
assessment to ensure that the new DIMS functions properly,
especially considering the amount of data NHTSA will receive and
have to screen as part of the early warning reporting rule, 6 and
(2) NHTSA should establish a peer review panel to ensure a
degree of consistency in the defect investigation decision making
process.227
First, in response to the IG's criticism of ODI's defective
database, Dr. Runge admitted that ODI's "outdated information
storage and management system" is incapable of "handl[ing] the
large volume of information that will be submitted under the early
warning rule""; therefore, NHTSA contracted with Volpe to create
a new "state-of-the-art data warehouse." 29 Dr. Runge expressed
confidence that NHTSA would have this system running, under
budget, by the end of 2002. °
Kenneth Mead appeared
unimpressed and continued to press for an independent third
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 96-175 and accompanying text.
223. Specifically, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce as well as
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. TREAD,
§ 15(b).
224. Hearing,supra note 2, at 12 (referring to TREAD Act, Section 15).
225. Id. at 12.
226. See supra notes 149-158 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
228. Hearing,supra note 2, at 14.
229. Id. at 12.
230. Id.
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party with software expertise to oversee the development of the
"
new DIMS.23
'
Second, commenting on the peer review panel utilized by
NHTSA as a result of the IG and recommendation, 3 ' Mr. Mead
noted that NHTSA "has increased the percent of investigations
opened." 3 However, Mr. Mead testified that the peer review
panel is not an "end state" and recommended that NHTSA "ensure
that (1) protocols for the panel process are written, (2) decisions
are documented, and (3) the panel receives and reviews
information when the defects analysis staff determine that an
investigation should not be opened. " 4
3.

Top Management Challenges

In a memo dated December 5, 2003, to the Secretary of the
DOT identifying the "10 top management challenges" in 2004
facing DOT, including NHTSA, the DOT Inspector Generalconsistent with its Audit Report (described above)-identified
implementation of the TREAD Act. 35 Specifically, the IG noted
that "NHTSA must fully implement its new safety defect
information system, called the Advanced Retrieval (Tire,
Equipment, Motor Vehicles) Information System, to receive and
store early warning reporting information to be submitted by
manufacturers. " " The memo encouraged the DOT Secretary to
"ensure that [NHTSA's] screeners and investigators are able to: (1)
analyze, in a thorough and timely manner, the large volume of
manufacturers' information expected; and (2) appropriately use
that information to determine when to open and how to prioritize
vehicle defect investigations." 37
Considering the scope and
amount of information that NHTSA will receive-discussed in
detail immediately below-the IG provided the Secretary with
sage advice. Only time will tell how well NHTSA responds to the
IG's concerns.
4. Postscript: The IG's "Follow-Up Audit"
On September 23, 2004, the IG released its "Follow-Up Audit
of the Office of Defects Investigation." 2' As its name implies, this

231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 22.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Hearing, supra note 2, at 24.
Id.

235. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TOP MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 1, 2, 5 (2003),

available at http'//www.oig.dot.gov/showpdf.php?id=1217.
236. Id. at 5-6.
237. Id. at 6.
238. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP AUDIT
OF THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, (2004), available at

http//www.oig.dot.gov/showpdf.php?id=1407 (Sept. 23, 2004).
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report summarized the results of the IG's follow-up audit of ODI
by evaluating NHTSA's progress since the IG's January 2002
report (discussed above).
The follow-up audit found that, although NHTSA has made
"significant
progress" in
implementing
the
twenty-two
administrative requirements of the TREAD Act,239 its ability to
reliably track defect trends is hindered because of a limited
computer system to handle the massive amount of information. 4 °
According to the IG, the computer system (known as "ARTEMIS")
"does not have the analytical capabilities originally envisioned to
help analysts sort through the large volume of [early warning]
information ...
and point them towards potential safety defects."'
In addition, ARTEMIS "cannot perform more advanced trend
analyses needed to find patterns and subtle relationships among
the various types of [early warning] information to point analysts
to potential defects warranting investigation."242 For example,
ARTEMIS cannot automatically notify an analyst if consumer
complaints and warranty claims are increasing due to vehicle
steering problems.243
The IG blames at least in part NHTSA management for these
problems, specifically noting that NHTSA "has not identified all of
the software needed to analyze the [early warning] information,
outlined the associated costs, or developed a schedule for
implementing these capabilities."2
On the issue of cost, because
NHTSA did not use "generally accepted cost estimating
techniques," the initial cost estimate of ARTEMIS rose from $5.35
million in June 2001 to $9.4 million in March 2004-accompanied
by a doubling in actual project completion time.245
Another area needing improvement is the peer review panel.
Although the IG's recommendation to establish a peer review
panel to review safety defect issues and determine whether and
when to open an investigation, NHTSA has not "finalized
screening procedures to ensure that analysts identify potential
defects for the peer review panel's consideration because [NHTSA]
has been waiting to begin receiving the [early warning]
information before determining how best to revise" its internal

239. To date, NHTSA has successfully implemented twenty of the twentytwo TREAD Act requirements, including thirteen of the fifteen required
rulemakings. Id. at 4. Of the two outstanding rulemakings, one is currently
being rewritten (tire pressure monitoring systems) and the other (certification
labels) is not being pursued. Id.
240. Id. at 2-3.
241. Id. at 5.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 11-12.
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evaluation procedures.246 As the IG points out, though, finalizing
these procedures as quickly as possible is important "given the
large volume of field reports" NHTSA is receiving each quarter
(since June 2004).247 Absent such procedures, analysts will have
no way to thoroughly and reliably sift through early warning data,
including other sources of information (such as technical
bulletins), when identifying potential safety defects for peer review
panel consideration.'
In order "[tio move ahead with the use of [early warning]
information for opening defect investigations," the IG concluded
with three recommendations for the NHTSA Administrator: (1)
ensure an "adequately supported" cost estimate for operating and
maintaining ARTEMIS; (2) revise the early warning data analysis
plan "to better define the advanced capabilities needed" as well as
identify software needed and establish a schedule with milestone
dates to obtain all needed capabilities; and (3) "establish
milestones for completing procedures to incorporate early warning
information in the defects screening process and train defect
analysts on the new procedures to provide reasonable assurance
that decisions relating to the opening of safety defect
investigations are based on thorough and consistent analyses of all
available defects information."249

II.TREAD's REPORTING RULES
Having closely examined post-TREAD events, from the IG's
audit to subsequent congressional hearings, this section turns to
the actual requirements of the three-pronged reporting
requirements: (1) foreign recalls and other safety campaigns; (2)
"early warning;" and (3) reporting the sale or lease of defective or
noncompliant tires.
A. ForeignRecalls and Safety Campaigns
On October 11, 2002, exactly one year after publishing the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 25 0 NHTSA published the
final rule that implements the foreign safety recall and foreign
safety campaign reporting requirements of the TREAD Act.251

246. Id. at 6.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 6, 18.
250. Reporting of Information About Foreign Safety Recalls and Campaigns
Related to Potential Defects, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,907 (proposed Oct. 11, 2001) (to

be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 579) (Notice 1).
251. Reporting of Information About Foreign Safety Recalls and Campaigns
Related to Potential Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,295 (Oct. 11, 2002) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 579). See also Nicholas J. Wittner, NHTSA Issues Foreign
Recall Reporting Final Rule Under TREAD Act, IJN's PRODUCT LIABILITY L.
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As an initial matter, the report may be filed by: (1) the
fabricating manufacturer; (2) the importer of the vehicle; (3) the
brand name owner of the vehicle or item of equipment; or (4) a
parent or subsidiary of such fabricator, importer, or brand name
owner of the vehicle or item or equipment that is identical or
substantially similar to that covered by the foreign recall or other
safety campaign.252 NHTSA specifically noted that "it would be a
violation of law for a foreign fabricating manufacturer to designate
its U.S. importer as its reporting entity, and then fail to assure
that it is provided with the information" about relevant foreign
recalls and campaigns."
Covered entities must report (1) foreign safety recalls or (2)
other foreign safety campaigns of identical or substantially similar
motor vehicles (or identical or substantially similar vehicle
equipment).
A foreign safety recall has four elements: (1) an offer by a
manufacturer to owners of motor vehicles or equipment; (2) that is
in a foreign country (i.e., outside the United States); (3) in order to
provide remedial action to address a safety-related defect or a
failure to comply with an applicable safety standard; (4) whether
or not the manufacturer agrees to pay the full cost of the remedial
action." When all four elements are met, the manufacturer must
report to NHTSA, whether or not the problem would constitute a
safety-related defect or noncompliance under U.S. law.25
An "othersafety campaign" differs from a foreign safety recall
in that the former has no manufacturer "determination" and no
offer of "remedy." As defined in the final rule, therefore, an "other
safety campaign" has three elements: (1) a manufacturer
communication with owners or dealers; (2) with respect to
conditions under which a vehicle or equipment item "should be
operated, repaired, or replaced; that (3) relate to safety."25 The
third element, as with the foreign safety recall definition, is quite
broad. The preamble notes that "[pirecautionary advice"
provided.., on the conditions under which the vehicle is to be
operated, repaired, or replaced may reflect the existence of a safety

& STRATEGY, Nov. 2002, at 5 (discussing requirements of final rule and

highlighting differences between the NPRM and the final rule).
252. Reporting of Information About Foreign Safety Recalls and Campaigns
Related to Potential Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. at 63,297.

253. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects;
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), 66 Fed. Reg. 66,190, 66,194 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.574, 576, 579) [hereinafter NPRM].
254. Reporting of Information About Foreign Safety Recalls, 67 Fed. Reg. at
63,298.

255. Id.
256. Id.
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problem" and is, therefore, reportable. 7 Other covered actions
could include extended warranty communications. However, ad
hoc determinations are not roped into this definition. Other
exclusions are promotional and marketing materials, customer
satisfaction surveys, and operating instructions or owner's
manuals that accompany the vehicle at the time of first sale.25
The biggest difference between the final rule and NPRM is
that NHTSA dispensed with the component-based approach and
adopted the approach used in the early warning reporting, namely,
a vehicle-based four-prong alternative test, under which a vehicle
overseas is "substantially similar" to a U.S. vehicle if: (1) the
vehicle is sold in Canada or certified to comply with Canadian
Motor Vehicle Safety Standars ("CMVSS"); (2) it is a gray market
vehicle (specifically, the vehicle must be "listed in the VSP or VSA
columns of Appendix A to 593 of this subchapter"); (3) the vehicle
is manufactured in the United States for sale abroad; or (4) the
vehicle shares the same platform as a U.S. vehicle.259
The term "platform" is defined broadly. A platform is more
than just the basic structure of a vehicle, including, but not limited
to, the majority of the floor plan or undercarriage, and elements of
the engine compartment. The term includes a structure that a
manufacturer designates as a platform. A group of vehicles
sharing a common structure or chassis is also considered to have a
common platform, regardless of whether such vehicles are of the
same type, make, or sold by the same manufacturer. "Examples of
vehicles sharing a common platform are the Chrysler Group's
Plymouth, Dodge, and Chrysler minivans... [as well as the]
Toyota Camry vehicles (including Toyota Camry and Avalon
passenger cars, Toyota Sienna minivans, Toyota Highlander
SUVs, Lexus ES 300 passenger cars, and Lexus RX 300 SUVs)."2
NHTSA followed the industry's request for submitting a list
each year of covered vehicles. Specifically, NHTSA proposed that
manufacturers identify by November 1 (starting November 1,
2003) any vehicles they sell or intend to sell in foreign markets
that the manufacturers believe are substantially similar to
vehicles sold or planned to be offered for sale in the United States
during the coming year. NHTSA later amended the due date to
"not later than 30 days after January 28, 2003.261

257. Id. at 63,299.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 63,300.

260. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,822, 45,843
(July 10, 2002) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 573, 574, 576, 579) [hereinafter
Final Rule].

261. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4,112-13.
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Recalls and other safety campaigns of original equipment
components or systems (i.e., parts installed on the vehicle at the
time of delivery to the dealer) are likely to be conducted by the
vehicle manufacturer.262 Suppliers need only report if they conduct
a recall themselves or if they are ordered to conduct a recall.
Recalls and other safety campaigns of replacement equipment
components or systems (i.e., everything other than "original
equipment," meaning tires, child restraints, headlights, brake
fluids, etc.) are conducted by the suppliers themselves.2u
Manufacturers need not report if one of the following three
elements is met: (1) a § 573 report has been filed and the scope of
the foreign recall or campaign is not broader than the scope of the
recall campaign in the United States ("scope" means the subject
matter of the recall and the time frame in which the recalled
vehicles were manufactured (e.g., model years of the affected recall
class)); (2) the component or system that gave rise to the foreign
recall or other campaign does not perform the same function in
any vehicles or equipment sold or offered for sale in the United
States; or (3) the sole subject of the foreign recall or other
campaign is a label affixed to a vehicle, item of equipment, or
tire.2"
In order to be certain that NHTSA is aware of all relevant
overseas determinations and notifications, NHTSA required a onetime historical report. The report was due within thirty days of the
effective date of the final rule (i.e., by December 11, 2002).21
However, if a foreign recall or campaign had already been reported
to NHTSA, it need not have been resubmitted if "the original
report identified (1) the model(s) and model year(s) of the products
that were the subject of the foreign recall or campaign"; (2) the
"identical or substantially similar U.S. products"; and (3) the
defect or other condition that led to the foreign "recall or
campaign.
The reports must be filed within "five working days" after
determining whether to conduct a foreign recall or foreign safety
campaign."'
The "five working days" period is determined by
reference to the general business practice of the office in which
such determination is made, and to the office reporting to
NHTSA.2
To show how the five business day rule is flexible enough to

262. Reporting of Information About Foreign Safety Recalls and Campaigns

Related to Potential Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. at 63,301.
263. Id. at 63,301-02.
264. Id. at 63,306.

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 63,303.

268. Id.
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recognize the realities of global multinationals, NHTSA provided
the following hypothetical:
The following hypothetical illustrates how working days are
computed. It assumes that a vehicle manufacturer's world
headquarters is in Germany, with subsidiaries in Asia and the
United States. The Asian subsidiary receives a governmental notice
on Thursday, September 1, that it must conduct a safety recall of
certain vehicles. That day does not count in the computation of the
relevant period, particularly in view of the fact that the notice might
not be received until late in the day. On Friday, September 2, the
subsidiary reviews the notice, and perhaps translates it into
German (Day 1). The subsidiary observes a Saturday and Sunday
weekend, and Monday is a national and corporate holiday. On
Tuesday, September 6, the subsidiary faxes the original and the
translation to Germany (Day 2). On Wednesday, September 7, the
German headquarters confirms that the vehicles are substantially
similar to those sold in the United States, and that the recall must
be reported to NHTSA (Day 3). The headquarters office is closed on
Thursday and Friday, as well as the weekend. On Monday,
September 12, the headquarters office prepares the report and an
English-language translation of the notice (Day 4). Headquarters
faxes the report, notice, and translation to its U.S. subsidiary on
Tuesday, September 13, but the subsidiary is closed that day. On.
Wednesday, September 14, the U.S. subsidiary would be required to
submit the materials to NHTSA (the 5th working day).269
Each report must be dated and include the following
information: (1) the manufacturer's name; (2) vehicles containing
the defect and description of the basis for the recall or safety
campaign; (3) total number of vehicles containing the defect or
noncompliance; (4) description of the defect or noncompliance; (5)
foreign country in which the recall or safety campaign is being
conducted; (6) whether the foreign action is a recall or safety
campaign; (7) whether the determination to conduct the recall or
safety campaign was made by the manufacturer or by a foreign
government; (8) description of the manufacturer's program for
remedying the defect or noncompliance; (9) the date the
determination to recall or conduct the action was made; (10)
identification of all vehicles that the manufacturer sold or offered
for sale in the United States that are identical or substantially
similar to the vehicles covered by the foreign recall or campaign. If
the determination was made by a foreign government, then the
report must also include (11) a copy of the determination in the
original language along with an English translation.2 7 °
The reporting of foreign recalls and foreign safety campaigns
effectuates the purpose of "enhancing motor vehicle safety by

269. Id. at 63,305.
270. Id.
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specifying information, including data, that may indicate the
existence of a potential safety-related defect or a noncompliance
with an FMVSS before the manufacturer or NHTSA has decided
that a defect or noncompliance exists." These new reporting
obligations emerged out of NHTSA's desire to avoid another FordFirestone situation. Specifically, Ford never informed NHTSAnor was Ford required to notify NHTSA under pre-TREAD law-of
safety campaigns conducted in the Persian Gulf, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Venezuela.
B. Early Warning Reporting
The heart of TREAD's three-pronged reporting requirements
is the "early warning" reporting. The TREAD Act amended the
Vehicle Safety Act to direct DOT (i.e., NHTSA) to complete a
rulemaking no later than June 30, 2002, to establish early
warning reporting requirements for vehicle and vehicle equipment
manufacturers to include information on: (1) defects; (2) injury,
death, or property claims; (3) customer satisfactions campaigns,
consumer advisories, recalls, or other relevant activities; and (4)
incidents in the United States where a manufacturer receives
actual notice alleging its vehicle or equipment caused fatalities or
serious injuries, or in a foreign country, where the allegedly
defective vehicle or equipment is identical or substantially similar
to that sold in the United States.27' Congress also included
requirements for manufacturers to report, periodically or upon
request by NHTSA, information that the manufacturer has in its
possession that would help identify defects in motor vehicle and
motor vehicle equipment safety in the United States.272
Congress further provided that NHTSA could include other
reporting requirements that the "NHTSA determines are
necessary to identify defects related to vehicle and equipment
safety in the United States."27 Before requiring any new reporting
obligations, however, "NHTSA must specify in its final rule how it
will review and utilize such reports to help identify defects related
to motor vehicle safety, what systems and processes it will employ
or establish to review and utilize such information, and the
manner and form in which manufacturers are required to
report."74 Even supporters of the bill agreed that NHTSA does not

271. TREAD, § 3(b). This requirement arose out of an en bloc amendment

offered by Representative Cliff Stearns (R-FL) and passed on a voice vote
during the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection markup. Michael Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD
Safety Bill, NAT'L J. NEWS SERV., Sept. 27, 2000.
272. TREAD, § 3(b). See also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 13 (summarizing the
reporting requirements).
273. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 13.
274. Id. at 13-14. Strikingly, no such limiting language appeared either in

20041

Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

1111

have a "fishing license." 75
1.

ANPRM

On January 22, 2001, NHTSA published the Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPRM") for early warning. 76 The
ANPRM sought public input "on ways that the [NHTSA] may
implement the 'early warning reporting requirements'" of
TREAD.277 A major focus of the NHTSA was to solicit comments as
to what type of information manufacturers should report. For
example, for warranty claims data, NHTSA sought comment on
how to standardize the information and how to avoid requiring
excessive warranty claims. 278 NHTSA also had to determine how
to handle claims involving serious injuries or death, which opened
2 79
a host of definitional issues in how to define "serious injury."
Other issues surrounded what constituted the requirements for
submitting field reports, consumer complaints, customer
satisfaction campaigns, design changes to parts, remedy failures,
fuel leaks, and rollovers. 8 °
2. NPRM
Upon review of the comments to the ANPRM, on December
21, 2001, NHTSA published the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Early Warning."
Reporting
Groups. The
NPRM
proposed
dividing
manufacturers into two groups with different reporting
responsibilities. The first group consisted of larger manufacturers
of motor vehicles (more than 500 per year), and all manufacturers
of child restraint systems and tires. The second group consisted of
all other manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle
equipment (i.e., vehicle manufacturers that produced fewer than
500 vehicles annually, as well as manufacturers of original motor
vehicle equipment and manufacturers of replacement motor

the Senate version or in the Senate report accompanying the bill. S. REP. No.
106-3059 (2000); S.REP. No. 106-423, at 7.
275. Quote taken from Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-FL), who offered the "early
warning" amendment to the TREAD Act. See Steel, supra note 271.
276. ANPRM, supra note 10. See Nicholas J. Wittner, The "Reporting
Rulemaking": Early Warning or Information Overload?, IJN'S PRODUCT
LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 2001, at 4 (providing an excellent discussion of
the ANPRM).
277. ANPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 6,532.
278. Id. at 6,537.
279. Id. at 6,538.
280. Id. at 6,538-39.
281. NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,190. See generally Nicholas J. Wittner,
Foreign Recalls and Other Safety Campaigns - a Sweeping New NPRM, I.JN'S
PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, Dec. 2001, at 6 (explaining the contents of
the NPRM).
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vehicle equipment other than child restraints and tires).2 2
As proposed, manufacturers would have had to report on a
quarterly basis ("30 days after the end of each calendar quarter")
the following information2 " electronically, in specified Excel-type
formats.8
Product Information. Because NHTSA decided against
establishing any thresholds, it proposed requiring manufacturers
to report production numbers of each model and model year and
nine years prior to the year of the reporting period (including
models no longer in production). 88 The production numbers allow
NHTSA to "normalize the number of claims, complaints, etc. per
unit of production." For all models with more than one type of fuel
system, the information would be reported separately for gasoline
powered vehicles and non-gasoline powered vehicles. For mediumheavy vehicles, a further sub-categorization is envisaged by service
brake system (e.g., hydraulic, air). NHTSA has designated twentytwo reporting categories: (1) steering; (2) suspension; (3) service
brakes; (4) parking brakes; (5) engine speed control (including
throttle and cruise control); (6) air bags; (7) seat belts; (8)
integrated child restraint systems; (9) latches (doors, hoods,
hatches); (10) tires; (11) fuel system integrity; (12) power train;
(13) electrical system; (14) engine and engine cooling system; (15)
structure (other than latches); (16) visual systems; (17) seats; (18)
lighting; (19) wheels; (20) climate control system (including
defroster); (21) trailer hitches and related attachments; and (22)
fires.2 6
Incidents Involving Death. Under the NPRM, NHTSA
proposed that manufacturers report each incident involving a
death that occurred in the United States, which is identified in
either (1) a claim or (2) a notice that alleges or proves that the
death was caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer's
product (e.g., a police report).28 7 A "claim"-unlike "notice"--need
not allege or describe a defect; rather, a claim need only indicate
an occurrence of death and that the manufacturer's product is
responsible for that death.
In addition, manufacturers would report each death that
occurred in a foreign country, which is identified in a claim
involving a product that is "identical or substantially similar" (as
explained above) to a product that manufacturers have offered for
sale in the United States. 24' The term "substantially similar" is
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,192-93.
Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,864.
NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,212.
Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,878.
Id. at 45,879.
NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,222.
Id.
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met if one of the five following tests is satisfied: (1) vehicle is sold
in Canada or certified to comply with CMVSS; (2) gray market; (3)
vehicle is manufactured in the United States for sale abroad; (4)
vehicle is a "counterpart"; or (5) vehicle shares a common
platform.289
Reports would indicate which one of the twenty-two reporting
categories is involved. If none is involved, then the report would
indicate "other."
Incidents Involving Injuries. NHTSA proposed that
manufacturers report each incident that occurred in the United
States in which a person was injured that is identified in either a
(1) claim against the manufacturer or (2) notice that alleges or
proves that the injury was caused by a possible defect. A "claim"unlike "notice"-need not allege or describe a defect; rather, a
claim need only indicate an occurrence of injury and that the
manufacturer's product is responsible for that injury.2' Reports
would indicate which one of the twenty-two reporting categories is
involved. If none is involved, then the report would indicate
"other."
Property Damage Claims. NHTSA
proposed
that
manufacturers report the number of claims for $1,000 or more in
property damage in the United States that are related to alleged
problems with the twenty-two reporting categories (including
fires)."
Consumer Complaints. NHTSA proposed that manufacturers
report the number of consumer complaints in the United States
that are related to problems with specified components and
systems. Indeed, manufacturers would be required to review,
maintain, and compile consumer complaints made "in any form,
including those made by telephone to customer relations
representatives (employees or contractors) and those made to
dealers that are transmitted to [the manufacturer], as well as
written communications directly to [the manufacturer]."'
Manufacturers would report the aggregate number of complaints
received about the twenty-two reporting categories (including
fires).
Warranty Claims Information. NHTSA proposed that
manufacturers report the number of warranty claims (including
unverified claims) in the United States relating to problems with
specified components and systems. As proposed, "warranty claims"
included the "number of repairs and/or replacements free of charge
under warranties, as well as those under formal or informal

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

66,199-200.
66,198.
66,201.
66,203.
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Good will includes
extended warranties and good will."293
"voluntary Buy-Backs and Lemon Law Buy-Backs." 9' As with
property damage and consumer complaints, manufacturers would
"have to maintain warranty claims, group the numbers of claims
by [the twenty-two] reporting categories, and report them."299
Field Reports. NHTSA proposed that manufacturers report
the total number of field reports in the United States from
employees and dealers, and from fleets, that are related to
problems with specified components and systems and potential
defects." In addition, manufacturers would submit hard copies of
reports received from employees and fleets, but manufacturers
would not need to provide copies of reports received from dealers.297
As with property damage, consumer complaints, and warranty
claims, manufacturers would indicate which one of the twenty-two
reporting categories is involved.
Although
Requirements.
Recordkeeping
Expanded
manufacturers were not required to submit actual documents
constituting claims and notices involving deaths or injuries,
property damage claims, warranty claims, consumer complaints,
or dealer reports, NHTSA did propose that manufacturers retain
each such claim, report, etc. for a period of "five calendar years
However,
from the date manufacturers acquire it." 99
manufacturers would not have to retain it after the calendar year
is, or becomes, ten years greater than the model year of the
affected vehicle. " For example, if on July 1, 2002, manufacturers
received two consumer complaints of 1996 and 1999 model year
vehicles, then manufacturers would have to retain the complaint
of the model year 1999 vehicle until July 1, 2007. Manufacturers
would only have to keep the complaint of the model year 1996
vehicle until the beginning of the 2006 model year, even though
fewer than five years had passed."°
Expanded § 573.8 Reporting. The TREAD Act's early warning
requirements of reporting "customer satisfaction campaigns,
293. Id. at 66,204. For more information on warranty claims generally in
the automobile industry, see Ed Garsten, U.S. Auto Warranty Costs Soar, DET.
NEWS, Sept, 14, 2004, at 1A (placing the annual warranty cost to automakers
at $12 billion, which translates into one to three percent off revenues,
according to AMR Research cited by Garsten). According to Garsten,
warranty costs are rising because: (1) manufacturers have shortened or rushed
product development cycles thereby hurting quality; (2) vehicles are becoming
more complex because they are relying more on computers and software; and
(3) "an overall push to lower costs that can adversely affect quality." Id.
294. Id.
295. NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,205.
296. Id. at 66,205-06.
297. Id. at 66,206.
298. Id. at 66,212.
299. Id. at 66,212.
300. Id.
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consumer advisories, recalls, or other activity involving the repair
or replacement of vehicles" 0 1 has been incorporated into the
§ 573.8 report. Specifically, NHTSA would essentially expand the
§ 573.8 duties to include all technical bulletins, etc. involving any
system or component of the vehicle, whether or not a "defect"
existed.
(The current wording of § 573.8 requires an initial
determination of "defect.") In addition, § 573.8 would be moved to
a new § 579.5. Finally, NHTSA would require a cover letter for
each monthly submission of documents. The cover letter would
identify each communication in the submission by name or subject
matter and date.
Historical Report. To "seed" the NHTSA database with
historical data, NHTSA proposed that manufacturers submit a
one-time retroactive report by April 30, 2003.302 The retroactive
report would provide information on the numbers of (1) property
damage claims, (2) consumer complaints, (3) warranty claims, and
(4) field reports.3" The applicable time period and scope for these
numbers is each calendar quarter "from January 1, 2000 through
December 31, 2002, for each model and model year vehicle
manufactured in model years 1994 though 2003."304 Each report
would identify the alleged system or component related to the
claim, incident, etc., as would the reports for the current reporting
period. Overseas data is not required in the retroactive report. 30 5
Accordingly, overseas claims for death need not be reported.
3. FinalRule
On July 10, 2002, NHTSA published the final rule on early
warning reporting.3" Since then, NHTSA has amended (as of this
writing) the final rule six times" and issued a series of legal
301. Id. at 66,214.
302. Id. at 66,210.
303. NPRM, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,211.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 66, 2 11.
306. Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,822.
307. The five amendments are: (1) Reporting of Information and Documents
About Potential Defects; Defect and Noncompliance Reports, 68 Fed. Reg.
18,136 (Apr. 15, 2003) (Notice 4); (2) Reporting of Information and Documents
About Potential Defects; Defect and Noncompliance Reports, 68 Fed. Reg.
20,225 (Apr. 24, 2003) (Notice 5); (3) Reporting of Information and Documents
About Potential Defects, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,132 (June 11, 2003) (Notice 5); (4)
Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects, 68 Fed.
Reg. 35,145 (June 11, 2003) (Notice 6); (5) Reporting of Information and
Documents About Potential Defects, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,568,(Nov. 14, 2003)
(Notice 7); and (6) Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential
Defects, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,867 (Sept. 28, 2004) (Notice 12). See also Reporting of
Information and Documents About Potential Defects, 69 Fed. Reg. 3,292 (Jan.
23, 2004) (Notice 8) (rejecting petitions for reconsideration that sought to raise
reporting thresholds from 500).
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interpretations. The amendments are discussed within the
analysis of the final rule (immediately below); the interpretations
are discussed in the section immediately following the analysis of
the final rule.
Covered "Manufacturers." The majority of the early warning
reporting requirements applies to larger manufacturers of motor
vehicles, and all makers of child restraints and tires. The rule
defines "manufacturer" as "a person manufacturing or assembling
motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, or importing motor
vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale... [and] includes
any parent corporation [of the manufacturer], any subsidiary or
affiliate, and any subsidiary or affiliate of a parent corporation [of
the manufacturer] of such a person.""'8 This expansive definition
implements NHTSA's perception of congressional intent to apply
the TREAD Act in an extraterritorial manner (i.e., to companies
and activities outside the United States that have an effect in the
United States).0 9
Bifurcated Reporting. The final rule splits manufacturers into
two
reporting
groups,
each
with
different
reporting
responsibilities. The first group (Group 1) consists of (1) vehicle
manufacturers that produce or import more than 500 vehicles per
year (i.e., large volume manufacturers), 0 (2) child restraint
manufacturers, and (3) tire manufacturers. The second group
(Group 2) consists of (1) all other vehicle manufacturers (i.e., small
volume manufacturers) and (2) manufacturers of original and
replacement equipment (i.e., parts suppliers) other than child
restraints or tires.31' This Article focuses on the requirements for
large volume vehicle manufacturers (Group 1).' 2
308. 49 C.F.R. § 579.27(b). NHTSA defined "affiliate" to mean "in the
context of an affiliate of or person affiliated with a specified person, a person
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediates, controls or is
controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified. The term
person usually is a corporation." Id. § 579.4(b). In adopting this definition,
NHTSA referred to the SEC definition. See Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,830
(citing Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2004)). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(a)(1).
309. Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,825.
Congress intended that
manufacturers, including multinational companies, "adopt practices to ensure
that all relevant information on matters for which reports are required is
made available to that corporation's designated reporting entity". Id. The
reporting entity is usually the U.S. importer, distributor, or manufacturer. Id.
at 45,827.
310. 49 C.F.R. §§ 579.21-579.26.
311. 49 C.F.R. § 579.27.
312. See Eric Rubel & Matthew Eisenstein, The TREAD Act and NHTSA's
Implementing Regulations: What Motor Vehicle Equipment Manufacturers
Need to Know, PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP., Feb. 10, 2003, at 131

(providing an excellent discussion of the reporting obligations of Group 2
manufacturers). In determining whether it will hit the 500 vehicles in a given

year, manufacturers should make "good faith estimates of their expected
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NHTSA has already issued several interpretations on the
issue of how to handle various brands or divisions within a group
company (e.g., whether a small volume brand (less than 500) that
is "affiliated" with a large volume company must report as Group 1
or Group 2). On this issue NHTSA has ruled that the parent
company must "aggregate" for purposes of production counts of the
divisions, parent, subsidiaries, and affiliates." 3 Hence, the small
volume brand would have the Group 1 reporting responsibility,
which is far more comprehensive (as described below). NHTSA did
rule, however, that the "parent may report collectively" for all the
brands, affiliates, etc., so long as "all vehicles are covered by the
reporting."3 4
Product Information. Group 1 vehicle manufacturers must
submit product information that states: (1) manufacturer's name;
(2) quarterly reporting period; (3) make; (4) model; (5) model year;
(6) type; (7) platform; and (8) production (stated as either the
cumulative production of the current model year to the end of the
reporting period, or the total model year production for each model
year for which production has ceased).
Report Format. The report must be organized such that
incidents are reported alphabetically by make, within each make
alphabetically by model, and within each model chronologically by
model year. Reports must indicate which one of the twenty-two
reporting categories is involved. If none is involved, then the
report would indicate either (98) or (99) (see immediately below).
NHTSA has designated twenty-two reporting categories: (The
annual production" of a category of vehicle, and they estimate that they will
exceed 500, then they should begin the comprehensive reporting in the quarter
in which the estimate is made, rather than the quarter in which production
actually reaches or exceeds 500. Memorandum from Jacqueline Glassman,
Chief Counsel, NHTSA (Dec. 12, 2003) (found under link entitled
"Anonymous"),
http'//www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/ewr.cfm?ewrdocs=
interpretations.
313. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Jason J.
Cavallo,
Halcore
Group,
Inc.
(July
21,
2003),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/lrules/interps/files/cavallo.ztv.html; Letter from
Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert S. Strassburger,
Alliance
of Automobile
Manufacturers,
Inc.
(Nov.
4,
2003),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/alliance(9-2-03).ajd.html;
Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Lance Tunick,
Vehicle
Services
Consulting,
Inc.
(Oct.
14,
2003),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/tunick2.ztv.html; Letter from
Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Rod Nash, Collins
Industries,
Inc.
(Aug.
20,
2003),
http'//www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/nash.ztv.html.
The NHTSA
maintains
an
online
database
of
its
Interpretations
at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/.
314. Letter from Jacqueline Glasssman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Jason J.
Cavallo, Halcore Group, Inc. (July 21, 2003), http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/
cars/rules/interps/files/cavallo.ztv.html.
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somewhat awkward numbering follows NHTSA's numbering) (01)
steering system; (02) suspension system; (03) service brake
system; (05) parking brake; (06) engine and engine cooling system;
(07) fuel system; (10) power train; (11) electrical system; (12)
exterior lighting; (13) visibility; (14) air bags; (15) seat belts; (16)
structure; (17) latch; (18) vehicle speed control; (19) tires; (20)
wheels; (22) seats; (23) fire; (24) rollover; (98) where a system or
component not covered by categories (01) through (22) is not
specified in the claim or notice; and (99) where no system or
component of the vehicle is specified in the claim or notice.
NHTSA removed the obligation proposed in the NPRM to report
on trailer hitches and climate control systems (including
defrosters).
Information must be submitted separately with respect to
each make, model, and model year of vehicles manufactured
during the quarterly reporting period and nine model years prior
to the earliest model year in the reporting period, including models
no longer in production. Reports must be submitted electronically,
in specified formats.
Incidents Involving Death or Injury. For all vehicles less than
ten calendar years old at the beginning of the reporting period,
manufacturers must report each "incident" involving a death or
injury that occurred in the United States, which is identified in
either a (1) claim or (2) notice that alleges or proves that the death
or injury was caused by a possible defect in the manufacturer's
product. NHTSA defines a "claim" as a request or demand for
relief and does not require the filing of a lawsuit.315 Accordingly, a
letter to a vehicle manufacturer that identifies the vehicle with
minimal specificity and sought compensation for a fatality or

315. Terminology, 49 C.F.R. § 579.4(c).
follows:

The final rule defines "claim" as

Claim means a written request or written demand for relief, including
money or other compensation, assumption of expenditures, or equitable
relief, related to a motor vehicle crash, accident, the failure of a
component or system of a vehicle or an item of motor vehicle equipment,

or a fire originating in or from a motor vehicle or a substance that
leaked from a motor vehicle. Claim includes, but is not limited to, a
demand in the absence of a lawsuit, a complaint initiating a lawsuit, an
assertion or notice of litigation, a settlement, covenant not to sue or
release of liability in the absence of a written demand, and a
subrogation request. A claim exists regardless of any denial or refusal
to pay it, and regardless of whether it has been settled or resolved in the

manufacturer's favor. The existence of a claim may not be conditioned
on the receipt of anything beyond the document(s) stating a claim.

Claim does not include demands related to asbestos exposure, to
emissions of volatile organic compounds from vehicle interiors, or to endof-life disposal of vehicles, parts or components of vehicles, equipment,
or parts or components of equipment.
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injury constitutes a reportable "claim." A "notice" includes a
document, other than a media article (such as newspaper articles,
publicly available Internet bulletin board postings, or other
materials in the public domain) that does not include a demand for
relief, and that the manufacturer receives from a person other
than NHTSA. 316 A "claim"-unlike "notice"-need not allege or
describe a defect; rather, a claim need only indicate an occurrence
of death or injury and that the manufacturer's product is
responsible for that death.
In addition, manufacturers must report each death that
occurred in a foreign country, which is identified in a claim
involving either their product or a product that is "identical or
substantially similar" to a product that the manufacturers have
offered for sale in the United States. The term "substantially
similar" is met if one of the four following tests is satisfied: (1)
vehicle is sold in Canada or certified to comply with CMVSS; (2)
gray market (specifically, the vehicle must be listed in the VSP or
VSA columns of Appendix A to part 593); (3) vehicle is
manufactured in the United States for sale abroad; or (4) vehicle
shares the same platform. Recognizing the difficulties in
establishing a reliable definition, NHTSA removed the proposed
alternative test of "counterpart."
If an incident involves more than one code, then each code
must be reported separately in the report with a limit of five codes
to be included. Manufacturers must also identify each separate
incident with a unique, consecutive number. This will allow both
ODI and the manufacturer to readily identify and refer to a
specific incident.
If the vehicle manufacturer does not know the vehicle
identification number ("VIN") of the vehicle when the incident is
first reported, then the manufacturer must provide an update for
the calendar quarter in which the incident was first reported. An
update is also required if the manufacturer originally indicated a
code (99) (i.e., system and component unidentified) and later
became aware that one or more specified systems or components
allegedly contributed to the incident. Updating is not required if
(1) the manufacturer learns that additional systems or
components contributed to the incident, so long as some
identifying code (other than (99)) was originally reported or (2) the
manufacturer learns that a previously injured person has later
died.
Property Damage Claims. Manufacturers must report each
property damage claim in the United States that is related to
316. Id.

The final rule defines "notice" as follows: "Notice means a

document, other than a media article, that does not include a demand for

relief, and that a manufacturer receives from a person other than NHTSA."
Id.
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alleged problems within the twenty-two reporting categories (note
that (98) and (99) do not apply). "Property damage claim" means a
claim for property damage other than vehicle component
malfunctions or warranty claims. NHTSA removed all monetary
threshold references; the NPRM had proposed that only those
property damage claims exceeding $1,000 should be reported.
Therefore, every property damage claim, regardless of amount
claimed, must be reported.
Warranty Claims Information. Manufacturers must report
the number of warranty claims in the United States relating to
problems with the twenty-two specified components and systems.
"Warranty claims" include the number of paid repairs and/or
replacements free of charge under warranties, as well as those
under formal or informal extended warranties and good will. Good
will includes voluntary buy-backs and lemon law buy-backs.
Unpaid warranty claims, claims that relate only to work
performed under a recall campaign that has either been reported
to NHTSA or conducted pursuant to emissions-related recalls
under the Clean Air Act (later expanded to include any state
emissions recall, such as one in California), and service contract
work done by dealers without backing by a manufacturer are not
reportable.
However, if a breach of warranty lawsuit is resolved with a
monetary payment, it must be reported as a warranty claim in the
quarter in which the payment is made. Whether this particular
requirement effectuates the purpose of early warning is highly
questionable. After all, a period of many months may pass by the
time a breach of warranty lawsuit is filed, reviewed, and analyzed
for settlement purposes. The benefit of early warning is thus
illusory in the case of many settled breach of warranty claims.
In addition, the definition fails to exclude warranty claims
paid under either service actions or customer satisfaction
campaigns, both of which often generate thousands of warranty
claims. However, the underlying problem is being addressed
(through the service action), though NHTSA will not know that
through the artificially-inflated raw warranty claims count. The
same rationale excluding warranty work conducted under a formal
recall should justify excluding warranty work conducted under
informal recalls such as service actions or customer satisfaction
campaigns. It is not as though manufacturers can "hide" these
actions from NHTSA, because NHTSA will know about these
actions as a result of the monthly reporting requirements,
described below (in "External communications and customer
satisfactioncampaigns").
Field Reports. Though not specifically addressed in the
TREAD Act, NHTSA sought comment in the ANPRM for "field
reports." NHTSA has authority under TREAD to require field
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reports.317 The final rule requires manufacturers to report the
total number of field reports in the United States from employees
and dealers, and from fleets (including company-owned vehicles),
that are related to problems with the twenty-two specified
components and systems."'
In addition, manufacturers must
submit hard copies of reports received from employees and fleets if
such reports contain "assessments," but manufacturers do not
need to provide copies of reports received from dealers.
If
employees or dealers have written more than one field report
about a particular incident, each (subsequent or additional)report
is reportable. Of all the required early warning data, field reports
are probably the most accurate indicator of a safety-related defect
trend. This was not lost on NHTSA, which stated in the final rule:
"Documents in which a manufacturer's representative or employee
raises or analyzes a potential
problem have often been valuable to
319
ODI in identifying a defect."
Consumer Complaints. Manufacturers must report the
number of consumer complaints in the United States that are
related to problems with the twenty-two reporting categories.
Consumer complaints include complaints made in any form,
including those made by telephone to customer relations
representatives (employees or contractors) and those made to
dealers that are transmitted to the manufacturer, as well as
written communications (including e-mail) sent to the consumer
affairs department (including the president or CEO, if such letters
are forwarded to the consumer affairs department in the usual
course of business). Manufacturers must report the aggregate
number of complaints received about the twenty-two reporting
categories (including fires). Consumer complaints are arguably
the least reliable indicator of safety-related defects because, as the
317. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(3)(B) (allowing the Secretary to request other
data (i.e., field reports) from manufacturers of motor vehicles).
318. 49 C.F.R. § 579.4(c). "Field report" is defined as follows:
Field report means a communication
in writing, including
communications in electronic form, from an employee or representative
of a manufacturer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, a dealer
or authorized service facility of such manufacturer, or an entity known
to the manufacturer as owning or operating a fleet, to the manufacturer
regarding the failure, malfunction, lack of durability, or other
performance problem of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, or
any part thereof, produced for sale by the manufacturer and transported
beyond the control of the manufacturer, regardless of whether verified
or assessed to be lacking in merit, but does not include any document
covered by the attorney-client privilege or the work product exclusion.
Id. This Rule incorporates changes made through Response to Petition for
Reconsideration, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,556 (Apr. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 579).
319. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,856.
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D.C. federal district court found in a landmark auto safety case,
"drivers can describe only what happened to them, which is an
altogether insufficient basis upon which to make a judgment as to
the technical adequacy" of a safety-related defect.32 Nevertheless,
NHTSA finds consumer complaint information valuable in
identifying defect trends. In the preamble to the final rule,
NHTSA commented:
As far as the agency is concerned, the utility of consumer complaints
for early warning purposes is not diminished by the fact that they
are based on the observations of vehicle users as opposed to persons
with technical training or experience. Such observations are often
what first alerts the agency to the possible existence of a safetyrelated defect, especially when warranty coverage is not or no longer
available.
As such, consumer complaints about safety-related
systems and components constitute an essential part of the proposed
early warning reporting system.. If the agency were to overlook
consumer complaints in anticipation of receiving a more technically
developed analysis of a potential safety problem from a
manufacturer, an entire mechanism for early warning would be
eliminated.321
Finally, NHTSA limited the consumer complaint information
to the United States only. However, it indicated that it might
later expand the reporting requirement to include consumer
complaints made outside the United States.322
As discussed above (in section I.C.2.b.), consumer complaints
are the least helpful early warning data, especially considering
how NHTSA has defined a reportable complaint. Not only must
manufacturers report every complaint, even if the complaint does
not relate to safety issues (e.g., complaints about door noise), but
NHTSA did not adopt a safety-based approach to reporting
complaints. The result of including non-safety items is that the
consumer complaint information will be potentially misleading. In
explaining why non-safety items must be reported, NHTSA stated
it does not "believe [it] would be appropriate to simply require
reporting of 'safety-related' problems, since manufacturers often
have a much more narrow view of what constitutes a safetyrelated problem than we do."
Expanded
Recordkeeping Requirements.
Although
manufacturers are not required to submit actual documents
constituting claims and notices involving deaths or injuries,
property damage claims, warranty claims, consumer complaints,
or dealer reports, manufacturers must retain each such claim,
320. GM 1, 656 F. Supp. at 1577. See also McDonald, JudicialReview, supra
note 100, at 1330-32 (discussing this case).
321. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects
Retention of Records that Could Indicate Defects, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,849.
322. Id. at 45,848-49.
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report, etc. for a period of five calendar years from the date
manufacturers acquire it. The NPRM had proposed ten years;
however, NHTSA responded to the industry's concern that NHTSA
had not estimated the burden and cost of storing the information
for ten years as opposed to five.
External Communications and "Customer Satisfaction
Campaigns." The TREAD Act's early warning requirements of
reporting "customer satisfaction campaigns, consumer advisories,
recalls, or other activity involving the repair or replacement" of
vehicles has been incorporated into the § 573.8 report.
Specifically, NHTSA has essentially expanded the § 573.8 duties to
include all TSBs, bulletins, etc. involving any system or
component of the vehicle, whether or not a "defect" existed. (The
former wording of § 573.8 required an initial determination of
"defect.") In addition, § 573.8 has been moved to a new section,
§ 579.5. Finally, NHTSA required - then later removed the
requirement - that each submission be accompanied by a
document identifying each communication in the submission by
name or subject matter and date.
Retroactive Report. To "seed" the NHTSA database with
historical data, NHTSA required that manufacturers submit a
one-time retroactive report by September 30, 2003 (the NPRM had
proposed April 30, 2003). This date was later changed to January
15, 2004. Manufacturers had to report (1) production data, (2) the
number of warranty claims or adjustments, and (3) the number of
field reports. A separate report was required for each calendar
quarter during the three-year period from April 1, 2000 through
March 31, 2003 (a total of twelve separate reports) for vehicles
manufactured in model years 1994 through 2003.
NHTSA
removed the proposed requirement of also including consumer
complaints and property damage claims. Submission of copies of
field reports is not required under this one-time provision.
Overseas data are also not required in the retroactive report.
Accordingly, overseas claims for death need not be reported.
Timing. The first quarter for which reports were required
was the third calendar quarter of 2003 (July 1 to September 30,
2003). As mentioned above, the due date for the historical report
was January 15, 2004. Beginning in 2004, manufacturers had
thirty days in which to actually file the reports after the close of
the quarter. Experience with reporting soon revealed that thirty
days would not be adequate for some manufacturers, so NHTSA
amended the rule to extend the deadline to sixty days from the
close of the quarter. Hard-copies of field reports are due at the end
of the first quarter in 2004. Going forward, the hard-copies are
due fifteen days after the other quarterly data (i.e., seventy-five
days after close the reporting quarter).
Miscellaneous Provisions. Each manufacturer must designate
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two employees to serve as contact points for NHTSA. These
employees should have a working fluency with the information
technology issues surrounding the reporting of TREAD.
NHTSA will commence an initial review of the early warning
rule within two years after the initial reports are received (i.e., the
Where necessary, it will make changes.
summer of 2005).
Subsequently, NHTSA will review its defect information-gathering
procedures at least once every five years.
The TREAD Act also requires all manufacturers to provide
information within the scope of the early warning provision when
NHTSA requests it. Under this new authority, the information
need only relate to preliminary investigative activities and need
only be of such a nature that it may assist NHTSA in the
identification of safety-related defects. On this basis, NHTSA has
already requested additional information from manufacturers if
the information in the early warning reports suggests that there
may be a possible problem. These "Death & Injury Inquiries"
(following up on reported incidents of claims and notices of deaths
and injuries) and "Aggregate Inquiries" (following up on other
TREAD data such as warranty claims, etc.) do not appear,
however, to be formal investigations, such as Preliminary
Evaluations and Engineering Analyses now conducted by ODI.
Because these Inquires are not investigations, they are not exempt
from requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act, which
requires NHTSA (and any other Federal agency) to obtain
approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before
imposing any new information demands from the private sector.323
In issuing the Inquiries, NHTSA will need to carefully balance the
authority provided to it under TREAD against the requirements of
OMB.
Cost-Benefit. Along with the final rule, NHTSA published a
"Final Regulatory Evaluation" (FRE).3 24 Although a thorough costbenefit analysis of TREAD's early warning requirements is beyond
the scope of this article, a brief summary of NHTSA's findings
reveals that, based largely on input from industry, NHTSA
estimated the start-up costs of compliance in the first year of the
final rule to be $70 million with recurring annual costs of $1.72
million,325 though others have estimated a cost closer to $2
First year costs were estimated to be between $68
billion.32

323. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521.
324. U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Regulatory Analysis, Final Regulation
Evaluation: TREAD Act Early Warning Reporting System Part 579 (July 10,
2002), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf82/178899_web.pdf.
325. Id. at ii.
326. See Nick Bunkley, "Early Warning"System Costly, DEW. NEWS, Sept. 1,
2004, at 1C (citing "industry experts" as estimating the cost of early warning
compliance to be $2 billion).
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million and $87 million.327 The costs are largely offset by the
benefits, which NHTSA identified as (1) investigations opened
sooner than before, which means that defective vehicles and
equipment are "taken off the roads sooner, and fewer injuries and
fatalities, and less property damage will occur, though NHTSA
was unable to quantify these benefits"328 and (2) a cost savings to
manufacturers of $9 million annually by stopping production of
defective vehicles sooner as a result of recall actions that are
conducted sooner than before.329
Confidentiality. As part of a separate rulemaking, NHTSA
addressed what early warning information would be entitled to
"confidential treatment" under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)33 ° and what would be publicly accessible.331
The
confidentiality final rule creates a series of class determinations.
NHTSA has determined that the following TREAD information
will not be entitled to protection from public release: (1) production
data on light vehicles; (2) claims of death and injuries (including
overseas claims); (3) notices of deaths and injuries (alleging a
defect);332 and (4) property damage claims. The following early
warning information was granted "class protection" from public
release and therefore has "confidential" status: (1) reports and
data relating to warranty claims information; (2) reports and data
relating to field reports, including dealer field reports and hardcopy field reports; and (3) reports and data relating to consumer

327. Id.
328. Id. at i-ii. NHTSA expects that investigations will be opened twelve
months sooner than usual (on average, it takes thirty-six to forty-five months
from the time the first consumer complains to a dealer before there is a
NHTSA-influenced recall). Id. at ii.
329. Id. at ii. NHTSA bases this savings estimate on "having the average
recall (manufacturer voluntary recall and NHTSA-influenced) occur three
months earlier for a subset of vehicles [that] are still in production when the
recall occurs and for which some recalled vehicle are three or more years old,
and assuming an average recall costs $100 per vehicle." Id.
330. FOIA exempts "confidential business information" from disclosure.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979).
331. Confidential Business Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,209, 44,216 (July
28, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 512).
332. Responding to the industry's concern of protecting the privacy of
customers, which could be violated by publishing the complete Vehicle
Identification Number ("VIN") of the vehicle involved in a death or injury
incident, NHTSA later amended the rule to disclose only eleven of the
seventeen VIN characters, holding the last six characters confidential.
Confidential Business Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,409, 21,416 (Apr. 21, 2004)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 512). By conducting a search on several
websites that offered to provide personal information on individuals based
only on input of full VIN data, NHTSA was able to determine the name,
address, date of birth, and lien information of the vehicle owner. Id.
Considering the ease of obtaining such sensitive information, NHTSA decided
to amend the rule of disclosing the complete VIN. Id.
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Other information entitled to "class protection"
complaints.
includes production numbers for child restraint systems, tires, and
vehicles "other than light vehicles." Currently, NHTSA is not
releasing any data, however, pending the outcome of a lawsuit
filed against it by Public Citizen."' The lawsuit seeks to force
NHTSA to release all the early warning information to the
public.3 4 The Rubber Manufacturers Association, a group that
represents tire manufacturers such as Bridgestone, Goodyear, and
Continental, has intervened in this lawsuit and filed claims
against NHTSA, asserting that that NHTSA should be precluded
from disclosing any of the early warning data.335

333. See Complaint, Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, No. 1:04-CV-00463-RJL
(D.D.C.) (filed Mar. 22, 2004) (on file with author). See also Jeffrey
McCracken, U.S. Keeping Crash Data Secret; Officials Backtrack on Safety
DisclosureAmid Suit by Tire Makers, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 24, 2004, at 1A.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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337
II ONGOING (QUARTERLY) REPORT
3-YEAR HISTORICAL REPORT
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NPRM

RULE
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Production
data

Warranty
claims

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Consumer
complaints
Employee &
fleet field
reports
Dealer field
reports

Internal
investigations
Design
changes to
parts

X

X

336. See Nicholas J. Wittner, The "Early Warning Reporting" NPRM:
Heading in the Right Direction, DIN'S PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY,
Mar. 2002, at 6 (discussing differences between ANPRM and NPRM); Nicholas
J. Wittner, TREAD's Final Rule: End of the Road?, DIN'S PRODUCT LIABILITY
L. & STRATEGY, Aug. 2002 (discussing differences between NPRM and Final
Rule).
337. The ANPRM only solicited comments, and did not propose affirmative
obligations. Standards Enforcement and Defect Investigation, Defect and
Noncompliance Reports, Record Retention; Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM), 66 Fed. Reg. 6,532 (Jan. 22, 2001). In addition, the
ANPRM did not solicit comments on historic reporting. Id. The obligation to
provide historical data emerged upon publication of the NPRM. NPRM, 66
Fed. Reg. at 66,190.
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X

Interpretationsof FinalRule

From time to time, NHTSA's Chief Counsel issues
interpretive rules. An interpretive rule is a rule that "describes,
clarifies, and reminds the public of a statutory or regulatory
standard or a pre-existing rule. " " 8 An interpretive rule differs

338. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 4.2.3, at 82 n.16 (2d ed. 2001) (citing four cases from the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. United States EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989); British
Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. CAB, 584 F.2d 982, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and
Guardian Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Chemical Waste
Management maintains that case law has "emphasized the distinction
between rules which create new legal obligations and those which simply
restate or clarify existing statutes or regulations." Id. In addition, Chamber
of Commerce held that interpretive rules "only provide a clarification of
statutory language... the interpreting agency only 'reminds affected parties
of existing duties."' Id. Finally, GuardianFederal Savings and Loan Ass'n
explained that "an interpretive rule is merely a clarification or explanation of
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from a legislative rule (such as the "Final Rule On Early
Warning") in that the interpretive rule "is not intended to alter
legal rights, but to state the agency's view of what existing law
already requires." "
The Chief Counsel issues her interpretative rules (more
commonly known simply as "interpretations") in letter form by
responding to questions from the motor vehicle industry and the
public.
Her interpretations represent the definitive view of
NHTSA on the questions addressed and may be relied upon by the
regulated industry and members of the public." ° NHTSA has
always made its interpretations open to the public in its technical
reference library in Washington." 1 With the invention of the
World Wide Web, the interpretations are now available on
NHTSA's website." 2
To date, NHTSA has issued forty interpretations of the early
warning final rule,' which is extraordinary both in number and in
time (rarely has NHTSA issued so many interpretations so quickly
after publication of a final rule).' The following table summarizes
each
interpretation
and
provides
cross-references
to
interpretations that address the identical or substantially similar
issues. The table includes all interpretations relevant to vehicle
and equipment manufacturers but does not include interpretations
to other industries affected by the early warning rules of the
TREAD Act (e.g., child restraint manufacturers).

an existing statute or rule." Id. For additional background on interpretative
rules, see Kevin M. McDonald, Are Agency Advisory Opinions Worth Anything
More than the Government PaperThey're Printedon?, 37 TEXAS TECH. L. REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 2004).
339. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 305 (4th ed. 1997).
340. To access a searchable database of NHTSA's interpretations, see
http'//www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/welcome.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2004). However, in a recent case before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
NHTSA contradicted a statement on its website, disclaiming that its
interpretive letters are the "definitive view of the agency" and making "clear
that the letters are simply advisory opinions about a set of facts presented to
the Chief Counsel." Air Brake Systems, Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 646 (6th
Cir. 2004).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. This count includes only those interpretations relevant to vehicle
manufacturers and does not include, for example, interpretations to other
industries affected by the early warning rules of the TREAD Act (e.g., child
restraint manufacturers). See also supra note 312 and accompanying text.
344. For a list of the interpretations by the NHTSA Office of Defects
Investigation
on
Early
Warning
Reporting,
see
http'//wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/ewr.cfm?ewrdocs=interpretations (last updated Dec. 12,
2003). For a searchable database of NHTSA's Interpretation Files, see
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
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Addressee
KME Fire
Apparatus345

Date
Mar. 26,
2004

[37:1073

Significance of Interpretative Rule
- A claim or notice of death or injury is
reportable even if the underlying alleged
defect does not directly involve operation
Example: A
of the vehicle itself.
manufacturer of fire fighting vehicles
must report a claim for injury or death
where, e.g., the fire pump (used to
discharge water through a hose) allegedly
failed, causing the death of a person in a
This would be
building or car fire.
categorized as "99." Rationale: NHTSA
the
has
'consistently
interpreted
requirement for manufacturers to report a
claim or notice of a death incident ...
regardless of the manufacturer's view of
(see
also
the
underlying
facts"
Interpretations to Miller, Johnson, Snell &
Cummiskey dated August 8, 2003 (deaths
reportable even if manufacturer's vehicle
or equipment did not initiate sequence of
events leading to death); Halcore Group
dated July 21, 2003 (reportable even if not
within defined component categories); and
NTEA dated May 14, 2003 (even if claim
arose out of aftermarket part)).

345. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Steven M.
Cormier, Esq., KME Fire Apparatus (Mar. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/Cormier.ajd.html.
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Baker Daniels3

6

Feb. 2,2004

1131

- Communications between manufacturers
and multiple recipients within the same
corporate family (e.g., subsidiaries) are not
"external communications" and therefore
need not be submitted under 49 C.F.R. §
579.5 (customer satisfaction campaigns,
etc.) "because [the documents] are not sent
to more
than
one
manufacturer,
distributor, dealer, lessor, lessee, owner or
purchaser."
In this case, the entire
corporate family is "considered the same
manufacturer for the purposes of 49 CFR
579."

346. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Melissa
M. Hinds, Esq.,
Baker Daniels (Feb. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/BakerDaniels.ajd.html.

1132

Japan Auto
Parts Industries
7
AssociationU

The John Marshall Law Review
Dec. 8, 2003

[37:1073

- Apart supplier need not report a recall
campaign conducted by a vehicle
manufacturer that does not sell motor
vehicles in the United States. Rationale:
The vehicle manufacturer, not the
supplier, determined that a defect existed
(49 C.F.R. § 579.11). In addition, "since a
foreign government did not require [the
supplier] to conduct a safety-related recall,
[the supplier] is not obligated to report the
recall." 49 C.F.R. § 579.12)."
Apart supplierneed not report claims of
death received by a vehicle manufacturer
that does not sell vehicles in the United
States. Rationale: The claim was made
against and received by the vehicle
manufacturer, not the parts supplier. 49
C.F.R. § 579.27(b).

347. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Keiko
Utsunomiya, Japan Auto Parts Industries Association (Dec. 8, 2003), available
at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/JAPIA.ajd.html.
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Anonymous Memo of Chief
Counsel"8

Dec. 3, 2003

1133

- In determining whether a manufacturer
will hit the 500 annualproduction
threshold, the manufacturer is required to
make "good faith estimates." See also
Interpretation to Vehicle Services
Consulting, Inc., July 24, 2003. For future
production numbers, approximation is
allowed when determining whether the
500 threshold is met. For production-todate numbers, manufacturers may
"approximate production information in
those situations where it is not
possible... to quantify the number of
vehicles, tires, or child restraint systems."
NHTSA anticipates "that such
approximation of past production to be few
and far between" because production
records are "usually kept in ordinary
course of business."

348. Memorandum from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA (Dec.
3, 2003), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/
ODI.approximationofproduction.html.
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1134

Toyo Tire
Corporation'

9

Nov. 19,
2003

[37:1073

- The EWR Compendium is not an
interpretationof§ 579 or the terms of that
section, "but merely is intended to assist
manufacturers in submitting
information." Any interpretive questions
'should be sent to the Office of Chief
Counsel."
- [Tires only] Tire manufacturers do not
have to report warranty adjustments that
do not mention involve the component
categories in 49 C.F.R. § 579.26(c). (This
Interpretation also affirms the Response
to RMA's Petition dated Aug. 26, 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,132, 35137 (6/11/03)). For
example, claims for "early ride"
complaints (with no failure condition other
than failing to meet subjective expectancy
for comfort or warranted mileage
projections) or merely "cosmetic" claims
"that did not concern a failure" are not
reportable.
- [Tires only] For determining the 15,000
tire threshold (in which case only incidents
of death and injury are reportable), the
standard is groups of tires with the same
SKUs. Thus, if a tire line has SKUs, and
if fewer than 15,000 tires with a given
SKU are produced (or expected to be
produced) in a given year, then only those
incidents (resulting in death and injury)
are reportable.
- [Tires only] If a tire is manufactured
outside the United States, the Tire
Information Number ("TIN") need not
include the plant name. Manufacturers
may provide country of origin. See also
Interpretation to RMA, Oct. 10, 2003 at 3.
- [Tires only] Warranty claims /
adjustments need not be reported if they
are denied "in its entirety." The tire
manufacturer need only report warranty

349. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Harold
van der Meijden, Toyo Tire (USA) Corporation (Nov. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/toyo.ajd.html.

2004]

RegulatoryAftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

1135

adjustments when it paid or provided
other reimbursement to a consumer
pursuant to a warranty program offered
by a manufacturer or goodwill. 49 C.F.R.
§ 579.4, as amended at 68 Fed. Reg.
35,132, 35,142.
- [Tires only] A tire manufacturer need
not file a report for a claim or notice of
death and injury when "the claim alleges
one or more deaths in a foreign country
involving a tire that is not identical or
substantially similar to one offered for
sale in the U.S." This corrects an error in
the Compendium (Version 1.0).
- [Tires only] For the historical report, tire
manufacturers should include the total
annual production of tires produced from
the beginning of each calendar year
included in the report until the close of the
quarter that is the subject of the report.

1136

Oshkosh Truck
Corporation 3

The John MarshallLaw Review
Nov. 6, 2003

[37:1073

- Trucks built exclusively for military use
with no civilian counterparts (designed &
manufactured exclusively for military) are

not subject to EWR. See also
Interpretation to Stewart & Stevenson,
May 21, 2003.
- Airport Rescue and Firefighting
('"ARFF") trucks and snow removal trucks
used exclusively for off-road service (e.g.,
at airports to remove snow or fight fires)
are not subject to EWR. See also
Interpretation to Grubb, June 12, 1995
(excluding vehicles designed and sold
solely for off-road use, such as runway
vehicle, from Vehicle Safety Act's
definition of motor vehicle). However,
snow removal trucks conducting on-road
work are subject to EWR.
-

Trucks designed for and used in on-road

civilian market, such as concrete
placement trucks, fall under EWR
"because they are civilian and engaged in
on-road work."
- The "determinant between full and
limited reporting(i.e., as small volume
manufacturer...) is the total aggregate
productionfor each reportingcategory of
vehicle defined by EWR." See also
Interpretation to Collins Industries, Aug.
20, 2003.

350. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to W.
Thatcher Peterson, Oshkosh Truck Corporation (Nov. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/Oshkosh.html.
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Association of
International
Automobile
Manufacturers,
Inc. ("ALAMI)

Nov.6,2003

1137

- The "bubble" portions on consumer
surveys ("requesting scaled, qualitative
evaluations or product performance" do
not constitute reportable consumer
complaints because "it[is] unclear as to
when or if a low rating rises to the level of
a 'complaint.'"
- Comments written by consumers in the
space designated for comment as well as
any pages attached by the consumer must
be reviewed to determine whether they
are consumer complaints.
- Notes written in the non-designated area
(e.g., marginal notes written in spaces on
machine read bubble forms that aren't
designated for recording comments) need
not be reviewed as containing consumer
complaints.

351. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (Nov. 6, 2003),
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/AIAM.ekmy.
html.

o
Allanc8
Alliance of
Automobile
Manufacturers...

The John MarshallLaw Review
Nov. 4, 2003

[37:1073

- "For the purposes of determining
whether the productionof vehicles meets
or exceeds the 500 vehicles per year
threshold in Section 579.21 et. seq., the
productionof the divisions,parent,
subsidiariesand affiliates must be
aggregated." Aggregate reporting is
"appropriate in order to capture all
vehicles manufactured by an entity with
affiliates or subsidiaries." See also
Interpretations to Vehicle Services, Oct.
14, 2003; Collins Industries, Inc., Aug, 20,
2003; Halcore Group, July 21, 2003.)
- Statements made at the public hearings
concerned "technical issues." The Chief
Counsel is the only NHTSA official with
authority to issue interpretationsof
agency regulations (citing 49 C.F.R.
§ 501.8(d)(4)).
- The interpretation on FMVSS No. 208
phase-in was limited only to No. 208; the
'concerns underlying that interpretation"
aren't the same as for early warning.

352. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert S.
Strassburger, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (Nov. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/alliance(9-203).
ajd.html.
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Alliance of
Automobile
Manufacturers

Nov. 4, 2003

1139

- EWR does not require reporting injuries
from incidents occurringoutside the
United States. In their reports on foreign
incidents, manufacturers do not need to
state the number of injuries (i.e., just
enter a "0").
- With respect to the United States, only
those injuries that are themselves the
subject of a claim or notice (alleging
defect) must be reported.

TurtleTOP

Nov. 3, 2003

- This decision was limited to TurtleTOP's
reporting responsibilities-for vans less
than 500 units per year, it must still
report claims and notices of fatalities in
United States.

353. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Janet L.
Kircher-Dudley, TurtleTOP (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.
nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/TurtleTop.html.
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Featherlite,
Inc.3M

The John MarshallLaw Review
Oct. 30, 2003

[37:1073

- Regarding trailermanufacturers,an
injury to a horse (which is tangible
property) is not a reportable property
damage claim unless "one or more
specified vehicle components or systems
has been identified as giving rise to the
incident or damage, or there was a fire"
(citing the preamble to 67 Fed. Reg.
45,822, 45,846).

354. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Norman
L. Helmke, Featherlite, Inc. (Oct. 30, 2003), available at http://www.
nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/featherlite(9-15-03).mtg.html.
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Recreational
Vehicle Industry
Association
(RVIA) / Monaco
Coach
Company 55

Oct. 22, 2003

- "Pre-Delivery Inspection (PDI) forms,
Dealer Acceptance forms (DAF), and other
pre-retail documents 'related to...
vehicles which are still in the direct
control of the manufacturer or dealer' are
not field reports. Rationale: Although
vehicles in the possession of dealers are
considered "beyond the direct control of
the manufacturer" for purposes of recall,
"NHTSA does not consider documents
prepared by dealers that address
particular vehicle [sic] prior to their first
retail sale to be field reports" for early
warning reporting.

355. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Lawrence
F. Hennenberger, Esq., Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC (Oct. 22,
2003), available at httpJ/www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/RVIAMonacoCoach.ekmy.html.
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Vehicle Services
Consulting,
Inc. 56

[37:1073

- [Confirming the Interpretation to
Halcore, July 21, 2003]. "[WPhere
individual small volume manufacturers
are held by a single parent corporation,
EWR reports could be filed by either the
parent corporationor each of the vehiclemanufacturingsubsidiaries,but in either
event, the production of all related vehicle
manufacturers must be aggregatedto
determine whether the threshold was
met." See also Interpretation to Alliance,
Nov. 4, 2003; Collins Industries, Inc., Aug,
20, 2003; Halcore Group, July 21, 2003.

Oct. 14, 2003

- Small volume manufacturers should
make a good faith estimate of its expected
annual production of a category of vehicle,
and if it is estimated to exceed 500, then it
"should begin comprehensive reporting in
the quarter in which the estimate is made
rather than the quarter in which
production actually reaches or exceeds
500."

£

___________

L

356. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Lance
Tunick, Vehicle Services Consulting (Oct. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/tunick2.ztv.html.
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Rubber
Manufacturers
Association
("RMA) 357

Oct. 10, 2003

1143

- Manufacturers that identify "significant
errors" in their reports should contact ODI
on a "case-by-case basis." However, the
same template that is used for the original
report should be used for updated reports
(Version 1, Version 2, etc.).
- [Tires only] The four calendar years
prior to the earliest calendar year in the
reporting period will be the four calendar
years before the calendar year of the
report.
- [Tires only] NHTSA will use RMA's
definition of "tire type code."
- [Tires only] Country of origin and date of
importation can, in some cases, satisfy the
regulation for identifying "plant of
manufacturer." See also Interpretation to
Toyo Tire, Nov. 19, 2003, at 3.
- [Tires only] Warranty productionand
tire production are cumulative for the
reporting period. For example, a tire
manufacturer's report for the third
quarter of a calendar year would contain
the total warranty count and production
count for a tire line for the first three
quarters. This is unlike numbers of
property damage claims and warranty
adjustments under § 579.26(c) (reporting
quarterly not cumulatively).
- [Tires only] No reporting is needed if the
system or component involved is not
specified in the codes. If a manufacturer is
unsure if a group of tires is used as
"original equipment" it shall state "U"in
the reporting field (citing 69 Fed. Reg.
35,144).

357. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Ann
Wilson, Rubber Manufacturers Association (Oct. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/rmaltrjul25.ztv.html.

1144

Collins
Industries, Inc.3' 5

The John MarshallLaw Review
Oct. 10, 2003

[37:1073

Collins and its subsidiaries must report
according to the aggregateproduction of
each vehicle category. "[F]or example, if
the spotter trucks are medium-heavy
vehicles, and Collins and/or its
subsidiaries also manufacture mediumheavy vehicles, the production volumes of
all these companies' vehicles must be
aggregatedto determine how to report."
See also Interpretations to Alliance, Nov.
4, 2003; Vehicle Services, Oct. 14, 2003;
Collins Industries, Inc., Aug, 20, 2003;
Halcore Group, July 21, 2003.)
-

358. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Rod Nash,
Collins
Industries,
Inc.
(Oct.
10,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/nash2.ajd.html.

2004]

Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

Motor &
Equipment
Manuf. Assoc.
("MEMA")359

Oct. 9, 2003

1145

- Regarding the reporting of § 579.27(c) "in the event an equipment manufacturer
reports an incident involving a death, it
should also provide in its report the
number of injuries, if any, if the incident
occurred in the United States." (NOTE:
This interpretation is modified and
clarified by the Alliance interpretation
from November 4, 2003.)

Alliance of
Automobile
Manufacturers'

Sept. 4, 2003

- Updating information on fatalities or
injuries need only occur "for a period of
five years from the quarter in which the
fatality or injury was initially submitted
to NHTSA." (NOTE: Resubmission of the
entire workbook is necessary.)

359. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Lawrence
F. Henneberger, Esq. & Christopher H. Grigorian, Esq., Arent Fox Kintner
Plotkin
&
Kahn,
PLLC
(Oct.
9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/mema.ztv.html.
360. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert
Strassburger, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Sept. 4, 2003), available
at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/alliancerecords.ztv.html.
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National Truck
Equipment
Association
361
(NTEA)

[37:1073

- Complete reportingfor medium-heavy
vehicles and buses is not needed if the
aggregate number of vehicles was fewer
than 500 "in the year of the reporting

Sept. 4, 2003

period and in each of the two calendar
years preceding the reporting period."
(This change is now consistent with
requirements for light vehicles.)
- "Although manufacturers reporting
under Section 579.27 [fewer than 500
vehicles] need not report incidents
involving only injuries, they are required
to report the number of injuries of which
they are aware that occurred in incidents
involving one or more deaths that are
identified in claims or notices received by
the manufacturer."
- The definition of platform can mean that
vehicles with "different structures on
common chassis" have the same platform.
This does not mean that "vehicles that
have common structuresadded by a final
stage manufactureron different chassis
also... have the same platform."
- "Finalstage manufacturersneed only
identify those models/vehicles that share a
chassis."
- Platform designationsare "determined
the same way for alterers as for final stage
manufacturers."

I

____________

£

361. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Michael
Kastner, National Truck Equipment Association (Sept. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/ntea3.ztv.html.
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Truck
Manufacturers
As •
Association

362

Aug. 22,
2003

1147

- Chassis-cabincomplete vehicles are
subject only to the limited EWR reporting
under § 579.27 even if these
manufacturers receive "warranty claims,
field reports, consumer complaints, etc."
that are not even received by the final
stage manufacturer. Rationale: "[F]or
many years, NHTSA has considered
incomplete chassis to be items of original
equipment." (Noting, however, that
incomplete vehicle manufacturers are
subject to NHTSA's defect and
noncompliance reporting under 49 C.F.R.
§ 573). (See also Interpretation to Spartan
Motors, April 11, 2003.)

362. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert M.
Clarke, Truck Manufacturers Association (Aug. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/clarke.ztv.html.

1148

Collins
Industries, Inc. s 6

The John Marshall Law Review
Aug. 20,
2003

[37:1073

- Under EWR, the definition of
manufacturerunder 49 C.F.R. § 579.4(c)
"includes parents, subsidiaries, and
affiliates. For purposes of determining if
the production of vehicles meets of exceeds
500 vehicles per year, the production of
the divisions, parent, subsidiaries, and
affiliates must be aggregated." (See also
Interpretations to Alliance, Nov. 4, 2003;
Vehicle Services, Oct. 14, 2003; Halcore
Group, July 21, 2003.)
- "The determinant between full and
limited (i.e., small volume manufacturer
under § 579.27) reporting is the total
annual aggregateproduction for each type
of vehicle defined by EWR... If the
aggregate number of either light vehicles
or medium-heavy vehicles and buses is
less than 500," then only the limited
information must be reported. If the
aggregate production of subsidiaries
exceeds 500 or more for a vehicle type,
then full reporting is necessary. In
addition, if there is anticipation that total
production "will exceed 500 before end of a
calendar year," then quarterly reporting is
required reports, even if the current
production was below 500 in each of the
prior two calendar years. See also
Interpretation to Oshkosh Truck, Nov. 6,
2003.

363. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Rod Nash,
Collins Industries, Inc. (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www.
nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/nash.ztv.html.
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Miller, Johnson,
Snell &
Cummiskey,
P.L.C."

Aug. 8, 2003

1149

- If a supplier (originalequipment
manufacturer)does not receive a claim or
notice of death in any quarterly reporting
period, it is not required to report that fact
to NHTSA.
- Regardless of proximate cause, if a
document received by an original
equipment manufacturer ("OEM") meets
the definition of "claim" or "notice" and
identifies the OEM's equipment with
'minimal specificity," then the OEM must
report to NHTSA as proscribed in
§ 579.27. (See also Interpretation to KME
Fire Apparatus, Mar. 26, 2004.)
- The word equipment comprises both the
completed "item of motor vehicle
equipment" and "each individual
component that comprises the item."
"Equipment incorporating... fasteners
would be substantially similar for EWR"
(e.g., if commonality present) "unless the
claim [or notice] specifically identified a
non-common component as the source of
the failure."
- "Sold or offered for sale" does NOT
include vehicles merely imported by
Registered Importers (e.g., Smart cars).
- NHTSA need not be informed if there
are no customer satisfactioncampaigns in
the previous month.

364. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Barry C.
Kane, Esq., Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, P.L.C. (Aug. 8, 2003),
availableat http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/kane.ztv.html.
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Vehicle Services
Consulting,
Inc.36

The John Marshall Law Review
July 24,
2003

[37:1073

- In any calendar year in which a
manufacturer produces 500 or more light
vehicles for sale in the United States, the
manufacturer must report under § 579.21,
regardless of how many vehicles it
produced in prior calendar years. (See also
"Anonymous" Interpretation, Dec. 3,
2003.)
- Any manufacturer that reports under
§ 579.27 ("because at least two years have
passed without it producing 500 or more
vehicles") need not submit the
comprehensive information of § 579.21,
"regardless of the number of vehicles it
produced during the preceding nine model
years." See also "Anonymous" Memo, Dec.
3, 2003.

365. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Lance
Tunick, Vehicle Services Consulting, Inc. (July 24, 2003), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/interps/files/tunick.ztv.html.
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Active Web
Services 36

July 21,
2003

1151

- Aggregate payments made to dealers
"without reference to any specific claim(s)"
and that does not identify and/or "report
the system or component upon which the
claim is based" are not reportable
warrantyclaims.

366. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Dan
DeDecker, Active Web Services, L.L.C. (July 21, 2003), available at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/activewebservices2.pdf.

1152

Halcore Group,
Inc.67

The John Marshall Law Review
July 21,
2003

[37:1073

- Definition of manufacturer requires the
parent to aggregate (for purposes of
production counts) the divisions, parent,
subsidiaries, and affiliates. However,
§ 579.3(b) allows the parent to "report
collectively or the incorporated entities to
report separately," so long as all vehicles
are covered by the reporting. See also
Interpretation to Alliance, Nov. 4, 2003;
Vehicle Services, Oct. 14, 2003; and
Collins Industries, Inc., Aug, 20, 2003).
- Finalstage manufacturersdo not have to
report warrantyclaims that they do not
process (e.g., that are sent to and
processed by the chassis manufacturer).
- If an end user contacts a final stage
manufacturerabout a chassis issue and it
advises to contact local chassis
manufacturer, this is a reportable
consumer complaint.
- Interiorcabinetry is not covered by any
category.
- Interiorlighting is covered by the
electrical category.

367. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Jason J.
Cavallo, Halcore Group, Inc. (July 21, 2003), available at http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/HalcoreGroupnc.pdf.
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Butzel Long

3

July 2, 2003

6

1153

- Reports of light'vehicle manufacturers
involving integratedchild seat systems
must be reported as seats (Code 22).
- Seat manufacturers (as OEMs) must
"report to NHTSA any claims or notices
involving death relating to its product."

Stewart &
Stevenson
Services, Inc.

May 21,
2003
9

- Reports under EWR rules are not
required for militarypersonnel carriers.
However, reports are "required for pickup
trucks, vans, and sedans that have civilian
counterparts."

368. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Daniel P.
Malone, Butzel Long (July 2, 2003), available at http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/ButzelLong.pdf.
369. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Richard C.
Kroger, Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. (May 21, 2003), available at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/stewartstevenson.pdf.

The John MarshallLaw Review
Southeast
Toyota
Distributors 7 °

May 16,
2003'

I

____________

[37:1073

- There is no independent reporting
obligation under EWR for distributorsand
dealers who only add accessory equipment
to a vehicle before its first sale, such as
"audio systems, tires, wheels, cruise
control, trailer hitches, luggage racks,
running boards, spoilers, truck bed liners,
and convenience equipment," to report
information to NHTSA, because the
manufacturer is responsible for reporting
information it receives from distributors
and dealers, such as field reports.

I

370. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to L. Taylor
Ward, III, Esq., Southeast Toyota Distributors, L.L.C. (May 16, 2003),
available at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/southeasttoyota.
pdf.

2004]

Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

National Truck
Equipment
Association
(NTEA)T7 1

May 14,
2003

1155

- "[L]ight vehicle manufacturers may
choose to include information about their
incomplete chassis along with their other
vehicles for which they report under
Section 579.21." Indeed, "type" includes
"incomplete vehicle" as a category of "light
vehicle."
- Foreign defect reporting and the annual
list of substantially similar vehicles will
be submitted in the future through a
NHTSA template on its website.
- The definition of "latch"does not include
"locking/latching mechanisms that are
located internally to a vehicle, such as on
the inside of a second unit body of a truck
or the interior of a trailer. . . .'Latch'
relates only to a vehicle's exterior doors."

371. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Michael
Kastner, National Truck Equipment Association (May 14, 2003), available at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/NTEA2.pdf.

Fod1otr5o6

SFord Motor Co."' 2

The John MarshallLaw Review
May 14,
2003
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- Information received by subsidiaries
such as Hertz is not reportable. This
includes claims for death, injury, or
property damage, or consumer complaints
received only by Hertz (on Ford vehicles or
other vehicles). Rationale:"[N]o other
vehicle manufacturer would have a
similar data source," and the results
would skew data. However, field reports
and warranty claims (because in Ford
system) come in.
-A

Third-partyextended warranty that is
purchased from a Ford dealer "in
connection with sale or lease of a motor
vehicle" is a reportable warranty claim.

372. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to James P.
Vondale, Ford Motor Co., (May 14, 2003) (on file with author).

2004]

Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-FirestoneTire Recall

Active Web
Services373

Sundown
Trailers374

1157

May 1, 2003

- Historicalwarranty information need
not be reported if not already in an
electronically-stored format. However,
future reports must be provided in
electronic format even if the manufacturer
keeps only paper records.

Apr. 30,
2003

- Regarding the submission of hard-copy
field reports, "such documents may be
submitted in paper form." NHTSA plans
on "establishing a naming convention for
field reports which will be set forth ...
the [ODI] ...

on

website."

373. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Dan
DeDecker, Project Manager, Active Web Services, L.L.C. (May 1, 2003),
available
at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/active
webservices.pdf.
374. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Vic R.
Cook, Sundown Trailers (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http:/wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/sun%20down%20trailer.pdf.
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-*1*

Waste
Equipment
Technology
Association.

Apr. 29,
2003
5

- Where a vehicle is manufactured in two
or more stages, the manufacturer that
certifies the completed vehicle is the one
who must report as a vehicle
manufacturer for early warning.
However, note the Interpretation to
NTEA, May 14, 2003.

375. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Gary
Satterfield, Vice President, Waste Equipment Technology Association (Apr. 29,
2003),
available
at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/
WETA.pdf.
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- "Priorapproval"documents sent from
dealers to manufacturer for purposes of
pre-approving a warranty repair are not
reportable dealer field reports because the
document "simply identifies the problem
as a foundation for a warranty claim, and
the action item sought is simply a
warranty authorization" and if "the
manufacturer approves the authorization,
the incident will be" captured in the
warranty claim count. Note, however,
that if the document contains an
"assessment of a performance problem to
the manufacturer and was not oriented
primarily toward warranty approval, it
would be considered to be a field report."

376. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Kathy L.
Samovitz, Associate Counsel, Coachmen Industries, Inc. (Apr. 29, 2003),
available at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/CoachMan.pdf.
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Memo: National
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Manufacturers
377
(NATM)
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- TREAD prohibits NHTSA from
requiring manufacturers to maintain or
submit info or records not in their
possession. Thus, "if a manufacturer does
not record, transcribe, retain, or otherwise
collect consumer complaints, contacts,
conversations, letters, and similar
conversations, then there is no obligation
to begin so under early warning
regulation."

377. Memorandum of Jonathan D. White, Defects Assessment Division, ODI,
NHTSA, (Apr. 24, 2003) (on file with author).
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- Vehicles rebadged (or branded) with one
name but manufactured by another name
must be reported to NHTSA by the
manufacturer,and not the "brander."
However, § 579.3 allows the brander to
assume the reporting obligation. If the
brander does not report, then 'the
fabricating manufacturer must count the
rebadged trailers in the aggregate of its
own production." If the brander "chooses
to report," the fabricator should not
include the branded in its part of the
production. The choice should be
consistent and not "revised from year to
year or within a given year."

378. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Michael J.
Hedeen, Esq., Haldeman & Associates (Apr. 11, 2003), available at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/etnyre.pdf.
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National Truck
Equipment
Association
79
(NTEA)

Apr. 11,
2003
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- "The only early warning reporting
requirements of Part 579 that apply to
manufacturers of originalequipment
(other than tires) are the limited reporting
requirements of 49 CFR 579.27." NTEA
members who are solely manufacturers of
original equipment have very limited
reporting responsibilities.

4

Spartan Motors
30

Chassis

Apr. 11,
2003

- Incomplete vehicle manufacturers are not
"manufacturers of 'motor vehicles' for

purposes of" early warning. Incomplete
manufacturers do not have "full reporting
responsibilities" under early warning. See
also Interpretation to TMA, Aug, 22, 2003.

379. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Michael
E. Kastner, Director of Government Relations, National Truck Equipment
available
at
http://wwwAssociation
(Apr.
11,
2003),
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/NTEA.pdf.
380. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Kimberly
Boucher, Compliance Administrator, Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc. (Apr. 11,
2003),
available
at
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/
Spartan.pdf.
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- Regarding "structure,""[g]enerally,
accessories that are installed inside of a
service body.., have little potential for
creating a safety-defect. We therefore do
not expect warranty claims" on accessories
such as "welders, generators, invertors,
etc.," all of which "do not change the shape
or size of the body." Note: This is
inconsistent with the final rule.

381. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to John D.
Evans, Vice President of Engineering, The Knapheide Manufacturing
Company
(Apr.
11,
2003),
available
at
http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/Kanapheide.pdf"
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Alliance of
Automobile
Manufacturers3

2

Apr. 11,
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- 10 calendaryears: A "claim involving a
fatality or injury occurring in a foreign
vehicle need not be reported if no sales of
a substantially similar vehicle have
occurred in the United States for more
than ten years before the beginning of the
reporting period. On the other hand, in a
situation in which a fatality or injury
occurs in a foreign vehicle that is more
than ten years old and a substantially
similar U.S. vehicle has been sold within a
ten-year period before the reporting
period," then a reportable 'claim" has
happened.
- For foreign defect reporting,no report is
required consistent with amended
§ 579.11(d)(2) -if a component or system is
present on a substantially similar U.S.
vehicle but does not perform the same
function as on a foreign vehicle." No
report is needed if the system or
component 'leading to the foreign recall or
other campaign is not installed at all on
the substantially similar U.S. vehicle."

382. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert S.
Strassburger, Vice President of Vehicle Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/alliance2.pdf.
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- Reporting is to be based on the face of
the claim or complaint, and not on any
assessment or filter.
- Marketing survey information:
Information collected directly from
consumers, either directly or through a
contractor is the source of consumer
complaints, "regardless of whether
primary purpose... is marketing."
Rationale: Consumers expect that the
complaint will reach the manufacturer.
Thus, third-party submissions are not
reportable, but proprietary are reportable.
- Dealerrepairwork orders are not
reportable field reports.
- Inspection reports "conducted to
determine eligibility for insuranceand/or
extended warrantycoverage" are not
reportable field reports because they are
"not prepared in response to an assertion
that a specific problem exists in a
particular vehicle, which is the normal
genesis of field reports."

C. Reporting on Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tire
Under pre-TREAD law, governed by 49 U.S.C. § 30120(i),
when a vehicle or equipment manufacturer notified a dealer
(including a retailer) that a new vehicle or part either did not
comply with a safety standard or contained a safety-related defect,
then the dealer was prohibited from selling or leasing the defective
383. Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Robert
Strassburger, Vice President of Vehicle Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of
Automotive Manufacturers, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http'J/wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/interpretations/alliance.pdf.
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or noncompliant vehicle or part.3" However, prior to passage of
the TREAD Act, this prohibition did not apply to the sale or lease
of used vehicles or equipment.
During the Ford-Firestone
congressional hearings, media reports indicated that some people
were selling defective Firestone ATX and Wilderness tires that
consumers had returned to dealers for replacement tires under the
safety recall. 85 To prevent these sales from happening in the
future, Congress imposed both a new ban on such sales as well as
a new reporting requirement that applies to tires only (not other
parts), failure of which triggers the enhanced civil penalties and
newly added criminal penalties.3"
Under this new reporting requirement (the third of the threepronged reporting rules), the TREAD Act directs DOT (i.e.,
NHTSA) to issue a final rule within ninety days of enactment (i.e.,
February 1, 2001) requiring any person who knowingly and
willfully sells or leases a defective or noncompliant tire with actual
knowledge that the tire manufacturer has notified dealers of the
defect, to report such sale or lease to DOT (i.e., NHTSA). On
December 26, 2000, NHTSA issued an interim final rule
implementing this TREAD requirement.387 On July 23, 2001 (more
than four months after envisaged in TREAD), NHTSA issued its
final rule (effective August 22, 2001), which did not differ
materially from the interim final rule.3" The final rule requires (1)
any person who (2) knowingly and willfully (3) sells or leases for
use on a motor vehicle (4) a new or used tire that is either
defective or not in compliance with applicable safety standards
with (5) actual knowledge that the manufacturer of such tire has
notified its dealers of such defect (6) to report that sale or lease to
NHTSA within five working days of the sale or lease. 89 Only
elements (1) and (5) require further discussion.
Regarding the first element (scope of applicable "persons"),
NHTSA expects this rule to "generally apply to tire retailers,
including individuals."3" Accordingly, car dealers, lessors, and
384. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,409, 81,410 (Dec. 26, 2000) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 573).
385. Id.

386. 49 U.S.C. § 30166.
387. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,410.
388. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,159 (July 23, 2001) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 573).
389. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,160. Regarding the sixth (last) element,
NHTSA chose five working days so as to be consistent with 49 C.F.R. § 573.5,
which requires defect and noncompliance reports to be submitted within a
five-day time frame. Id.
390. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Non-
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rental companies are not subject to the reporting requirements of
this rule, except with respect to tires that they may sell or lease
separately from the vehicle. 91 The principle of respondeat superior
applies to this rule, however, such that employers, principals, and
other persons who are legally responsible for the actions of their
employees or agents must report any covered sales or leases of
their employees or agents.39 ' For example, if an employee of a tire
retailer sells or leases a tire that is either defective or fails to
comply with an applicable safety standard, then both the employee
and the tire retailer would have to report the sale within five
working days to NHTSA, and both would be accountable if the sale
was not reported. 93 However, only one report per covered sale or
lease is required, such that either an employee or the employer
need file a report under the rule. 94
Regarding the fifth element ("actual knowledge"), the House
Commerce Committee made clear in its report accompanying
TREAD that the phrase "knowingly and willfully" is meant to
"represent the common and traditional meaning of those words
involving actual knowledge and will action, as opposed to
including any facet of reckless disregard. " 5 As implemented by
NHTSA in the final rule, a covered person "must have actual
knowledge that the manufacturer of the tire at issue had notified
its dealers of the defect or noncompliance.""
However, a covered
person need not have received notification directly from the
manufacturer; rather, a person's "actual knowledge that the
notification was made to dealers would be sufficient to invoke the
reporting requirement" of the rule. 9 '
Failure to report a sale or lease of a defective or noncompliant
tire will trigger the civil penalty ($5,000 per violation and $16.05
million for a related series of violations) and criminal penalty
provisions added by TREAD (fines, or imprisonment up to fifteen
years or both)."9 The reporting obligation drops if the defect or
compliant Tires, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,411.
391. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,160.
392. Id. However, only one report per covered sale or lease is required, such
that either an employee or her employer could file a report pursuant to the
new rule. Id.
393. Id. See also Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of
Defective or Non-compliant Tires, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,411 (adding that only one
report for covered sale or lease is required, allowing either the employee or the
retailer to file a report).

394. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,160.
395. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 14.
396. Motor Vehicle Safety; Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,160.

397. Id.
398. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30165(a), 30166, 30170. On June 14, 2004, to comply with
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noncompliance is remedied before the sale or lease, or if the recall
order is restrained or set aside in a civil action.3 "
It is unclear why Congress would not take the logical step of
extending the reporting obligation to sales and leases of all
defective or noncompliant parts and vehicles. If the intent of the
reporting obligation is to ensure that consumers are protected
from purchasing or leasing defective or noncompliant auto parts,
then Congress has missed the mark by limiting this obligation to
tires only. Extending the reporting obligation to defective and
noncompliant parts and vehicles would also be consistent with the
Vehicle Safety Act, which prohibits the manufacture, sale, and
importing of noncompliant vehicles and equipment.4"
How
effective this law will be, in terms of numbers of people actually
reporting their underlying illegal sale or lease, is an entirely
different question. In this regard, even NHTSA sees a certain
absurdity.
According to Kenneth Weinstein, NHTSA's
Administrator for Safety Assurance, "[tihe TREAD Act makes it
illegal to sell recalled products, and if you do, you have to report it
to us... [tihis law was written by a lot of different people at a lot
of different times."4 1
III. INCREASED PENALTIES

A.

Civil Penalties

Two weeks after enactment of the TREAD Act, NHTSA
published a final rule implementing TREAD's amendments to the
Vehicle Safety Act's civil penalties. 42 Under these amendments,
the civil penalty for a single violation of the Vehicle Safety Act is
increased from $1,100 to $5,000, and the maximum civil penalty
for a related series of violations is increased from $925,000 to

federal law (requiring adjustments for inflation), NHTSA raised the civil
penalty to $16,050,000 for a related series of violations. See Civil Penalties, 69
Fed. Reg. 32,963 (June 14, 2004).
399. 49 U.S.C. § 30166.
400. 49 U.S.C. § 30112.
Interestingly, the Act does not prohibit the
manufacture, sale, or importing of defective vehicles. Rather, in cases of
vehicles containing safety-related defects, the Act provides for civil damages
when a manufacturer fails to satisfy the notification and remedy duty. See,
e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (imposing civil penalties for failing to notify owners
and purchasers under 49 U.S.C. § 30119(c) and (d)).
401. Miles Moore, TREAD Act Reality: NHTSA's Powers Now Greatly
Expanded, TIRE Bus., Apr. 1, 2002, at 9. Note that Mr. Weinstein overstated
the actual reporting requirements of TREAD.
He should have replaced

.products" in the above quotation with "tires."
402. Civil Penalties; Registered Importers of Vehicles Not Originally
Manufactured to Conform to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 65
Fed. Reg. 68,108, 68,110 (Nov. 14, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 578,
592).
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$16,050,000.43 (Note that a separate violation occurs for every
motor vehicle or item of equipment and for each failure or refusal
to allow or perform an act required under applicable sections of
the Act.') These amendments are self-executing, which means
that NHTSA was not required to undertake a rulemaking to
implement the increased civil penalties. Nevertheless, NHTSA
published a final rule in order to properly effectuate the statutory
amendments with conforming amendments to the Code of Federal
Regulations."'
The TREAD Act takes a two-prong approach to amending the
civil penalty provisions' of the Vehicle Safety Act. First, the
TREAD Act increases the maximum penalty from $1,100 to $5,000
for each violation of the Vehicle Safety Act (e.g., failing to recall a
noncompliant vehicle) and from $925,000 to $15,000,000 (later
raised to $16,050,000) for a related series of violations, effective as
of the date of enactment (November 1, 2000).' 07
Second, the TREAD Act amends the civil penalty provisions of
the Vehicle Safety Act 4" to provide that any person who violates
the Inspections, Investigations, and Records provisions4 "9 of the
Vehicle Safety Act (or any regulations issued thereunder) is liable
to pay the U.S. government a civil penalty "for failing or refusing
to allow or perform an act required under that section or
regulation."'
As envisaged under the first prong, the maximum penalty for
such a violation is $5,000 per violation per day.41' Also, as
envisaged under the first prong, the maximum penalty for a
related series of daily violations is $16,050,000 (effective beginning
on October 28, 2004).412 Finally, again as envisaged under the
first-prong, these penalties apply as of the date of the TREAD
Act's enactment (i.e., November 1, 2000) to obligations existing
under the previous Inspections, Investigations, and Records

403. 49 U.S.C. § 30165.
404. Id.
405. Civil Penalties; Registered Importers of Vehicles Not Originally
Manufactured to Conform to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 65

Fed. Reg. at 68,109.
406. 49 U.S.C. § 30165.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 30166.
Id. 30165.
Id.
Id. See also Civil Penalties, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,864; 57,865 (Sept. 28, 2004)

(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578.6 (increasing the maximum civil penalty for
related series of motor vehicle safety violations from $15,000,000 to
$16,050,000 but keeping maximum civil penalty for a single violation at
$5,000 "because the inflation-adjusted figures are not yet at a level to be
increased" under Federal law).
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provisions that were unchanged by TREAD."
These penalties
also apply to violations of the following three new sections added
by TREAD: (1) Reporting of Defects in Motor Vehicles and
Products in Foreign Countries;
(2) Early Warning Reporting
Requirements;
and (3) Prohibition on the Sale or Lease of
Defective or Noncompliant Tires.1 6
Why Congress chose the two-prong approach is unclear. Up
until passage of the TREAD Act, the civil penalty provisions of the
Vehicle Safety Act authorized the same penalties for any violation
of the Act and did not distinguish between certain provisions of
the Act."7 Perhaps Congress meant to highlight the importance of
the new sections"8 by adding a separate reference in the civil
penalty provision. Whatever the reason, the excess verbiage in the
Code as well as in the regulations resulting from the
corresponding amendments is unneeded and was clearly avoidable
if Congress would have simply followed the pre-TREAD format.
B. CriminalPenalties
The TREAD Act amended for the first time the Vehicle Safety
Act to include criminal penalties where: (1) a person or
corporation 9 (2) violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (i.e., material
misrepresentation or concealment to the Federal government)42.
413. Civil Penalties; Registered Importers of Vehicles Not Originally
Manufactured to Conform to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 65
Fed. Reg. at 68,109. In short, these obligations include recordkeeping
requirements and providing dealer and consumer communications to NHTSA.
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30166(e)-(f).
414. 49 U.S.C. § 30166.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a) (1994) (prior to the TREAD Act amendments).
418. The three new sections added by TREAD to 49 U.S.C. § 31066 are (1)
Reporting on Defects in Foreign Countries; (2) Early Warning Reporting; and
(3) Ban on the Sale or Lease of Defective or Non-compliant Tires. TREAD § 3.
419. Corporate criminal liability can extend to manufacturers on the basis of
intentionally misleading statements made by the appointed agent acting
within the scope of his or her employment, because corporate guilt may be
premised solely upon the acts of its agents. See, e.g., United States v. Steiner
Plastics Mfg. Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2nd Cir. 1956), (finding that a jury may find a
corporation guilty, but not the president guilty as an individual, because
corporate guilt may be premised upon acts of its agents other than the
president); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 n.5
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a corporation may be convicted of making and
using false documents in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency
on the basis of action taken by an agent of the corporation acting within scope
of employment when the action is taken at least in part to benefit the
corporation). The court also found no requirement that any officer or director
knowingly and willfully participate in or authorize the unauthorized practice.

Id.
420. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes it a crime to (1) knowingly and willfully (2)
falsify, conceal, cover up, or make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
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with respect to the reporting requirements of § 30166421 (3) with
the intent of misleading NHTSA (4) regarding safety-related
defects in motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment" that (5)
have caused death or serious bodily injury. 423 All five elements
must be present for criminal liability to arise, which takes the
form of a fine under title 18 (up to $250,000 for individuals4 4 and
$500,000 for corporations411), or imprisonment up to fifteen years,
or both.426 Similar to the civil penalty provisions, these criminal
penalty provisions are self-executing (i.e., NHTSA did not need to
issue a separate implementing rulemaking).
The second of the above five elements presents the most
difficult issues. First, no one knows for sure when a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 occurs. Yet, this element presupposes the existence
of such a violation. NHTSA itself refused to offer any guidance as
to when a "violation" of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 occurs, claiming
(correctly so) in the final rule that clarity can be offered only by
the judiciary and, further, that TREAD limited NHTSA's criminal
rulemaking power to provide only for safe harbor (discussed
below).427 NHTSA's deference to the judiciary, however, offers
little assistance to those who must comply with TREAD (and,
therefore, with 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
At the outset, case law is split on the issue of whether
criminal liability should be imposed where the false statements

statement or representation (3) in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.
421. Note that other reporting requirements emerge out of 49 U.S.C. § 30166
and are also covered by the newly added criminal penalty provisions, namely,
defect and noncompliance reports as well as reporting on dealer and customer
communications. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(e)-(f).
422. This Article will not explore the numerous difficulties inherent in
determining the existence of a "safety-related defect." Basically, neither
NHTSA nor the courts have developed a sound definition of "safety-related
defect." Rather, a "safety-related defect" is determined on a case-by-case basis
after extensive fact-finding and often only after extensive engineering and
legal analysis. Therefore, I leave to a separate time the task of providing a
sound definition of a "safety-related defect."
423. 49 U.S.C. § 30170. The fifth element is defined via reference to 18
U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) ("Tampering with Consumer Products"). Id. That section
defines "death or serious bodily injury to an individual" as a bodily injury
which involves: (1) a substantial risk of death; (2) extreme physical pain; (3)
protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (4) protracted loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. 18 U.S.C. § 1365.
424. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b). See also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 14-15.
425. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c). See also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 14-15.
426. 49 U.S.C. § 30170 (emphasis added).
427. Motor Vehicle Safety: Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed.
Reg. 38,380, 38,381-82 (July 24, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578).
The latter argument offered by NHTSA is the more persuasive than the
former.
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are made by a person not under oath and not under a duty to
speak.428 Although some cases require an oath or a duty to speak
as a prerequisite to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a significant number
of cases as well as the Department of Justice ("DOJ") require
429
neither an oath nor a duty to speak to find criminal liability.
Therefore, a cautious interpretation may cover not only anyone
speaking to NHTSA on behalf of the manufacturer (under oath or
not), whether speaking orally or in writing, but also anyone who
fails to speak to NHTSA with the intent of concealing or covering
up a "material fact."' °

428. See United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Colo. 1953) (holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 should not be construed to extend to cases where false
statements are made by a person not under oath and not under a duty to
speak, but should be limited in its application to persons under legal
obligation to speak or give information to representatives of U.S. agencies or
departments that have authority to finally dispose of matter being
investigated, and to cases where keeping of records or filing of documents are
required or permitted by law). But see United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d. 1124,
1157-58 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that oral, conversational responses given in
an interview with IRS agents, even if not given under oath, are nevertheless
sufficient to support a charge of false statements to IRS agents in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001).
429. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 9 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL

at
902,
available
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00902.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (providing the 1996 Amendments to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001). See United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(affirming imposition of criminal liability even absent an oath or a duty to
speak). In keeping with its liberal interpretation of the terms in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, the Second Circuit has applied the term "statement" to statements not
required by law, not under oath, and not in writing. Id. at 487. See also
United States v. Van Valkenberg, 157 F. Supp. 599, 601 (D. Alaska 1958)
(rejecting United States v. Levin and finding that "there is no necessity under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 that the 'statements or representations' be made while under
a legal obligation to speak"); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 applies to both oral and written
statements and unsworn as well as sworn statements); United States v. Des
Jardins, 772 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not
overly broad because it punishes unsworn oral statements); United States v.
Dumas, 288 F. 247, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 1923) (holding that false statements need
not be made under oath to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001). See also H.R. REP. No.
104-680, at 8 (1996) (stating that "[0]ther than establishing materiality as an
element of all three offenses, the Committee does not view the offenses defined
in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as changing already existing case law as it
relates to the elements of the offenses") Id. However, certain limitations do
exist concerning statements within the jurisdiction of the judicial and
legislative branches. False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-292, § 2(c), 110 Stat. 3459 (1996).
430. See, e.g., Massey, 550 F.2d at 305 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 applies
to both oral and written statements); Pereira,463 F. Supp. at 487 (finding the
defendant's negative response to a Customs agent's inquiry as to whether he
had anything to declare was a "statement" within the scope of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001); United States v. Clifford, 409 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
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In addition, the scope of personal criminal liability reaches
individuals who have "aided and abetted" the lying or misleading
of NHTSA. a1
Accordingly, if someone from a manufacturer,
together with the appointed agent of that manufacturer, was
shown to have engaged in a scheme to defraud NHTSA, it is
unclear whether the non-agent individual could also be held
personally criminally liable under either the aiding and abetting
approach favored by the DOJ and a number of courts, which would
extend liability in this case based on the concealment of a material
fact, whether or not that person had an independent duty to speak
to NHTSA.
Second, although the individual or manufacturer must have
actual knowledge that the statement is false at the time the
statement is made (or concealed), the individual or manufacturer
does not have to know that lying to the government is a crime or
even that the matter being lied about is "within the jurisdiction" of
a government agency.
Regarding the actual knowledge
component, however, the legislative history of TREAD is clear
(even if the case law is not) that the knowingly and willful
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 could or should not be construed
to include reckless disregard.'
Third, TREAD provides that the DOJ may bring a criminal
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 may be applied to oral unsworn statements and
the defendant need not have initiated the investigation).
431. See Driver v. United States, 199 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir. 1952) (holding
that a person who permitted another to make out and file a false income tax
return in order to obtain a refund of fictitious overpayment of income taxes
could be convicted as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United
States v. Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that the United
States could properly prosecute the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for
having aided and abetted in preparation of false payroll records to the U.S.
Navy); United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that
a person with no duty to file Currency Transaction Reports ("CTRs") can be
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 on account of aiding and abetting a
financial institution's failure to file CTRs).
432. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69 (1984).
433. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15. See also McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me,
supra note 4, at 1200 n.164. Congress's intent here seems to contradict case
law. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that a person who makes a false statement with reckless disregard of
truthfulness of the statement is deemed to have knowledge of this statement
and its truthfulness or lack thereof); United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120,
1121 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding "reckless indifference" may be equated with
"knowingly and willfully"); United States v. Gottlieb, 493 F.2d. 987, 994 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that a false statement regarding membership in the Army
National Guard made with "reckless disregard" of its truth or falsity would
support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v. Clearfield, 358
F. Supp. 564, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that knowledge of actual falsity is
not required under 18 U.S.C. § 1001; rather, conviction can be based on a
finding that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of whether a
statement was true and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth).
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action, or initiate grand jury proceedings, for a violation of the new
criminal provisions "only at the request of the Secretary of
Transportation. '4 Critics charge that this hampers the DOJ's
independence; however, this condition is probably an appropriate
check on the DOJ.
In addition, DOT has more intimate
background knowledge and is likely in a better position than DOJ
to initially determinate whether criminal action is warranted.
Most agencies lack the statutory authority to litigate on their
behalf. As envisaged under TREAD for DOT, these agencies must
obtain representation from the DOJ, and the DOJ's refusal to
litigate a particular agency decision may mean that the agency's
decision has no real effect. 5 Finally, although DOT must request
action, DOJ will ultimately determine whether to proceed to
litigation. To the extent the President can control litigation
through the DOJ, this is an appropriate tool of executive oversight
and may resolve differences between the President and the DOT.
(Of course, differences between the DOJ and the President could
exist, too.)
To summarize, it is unclear whether personal criminal
liability reaches not only the manufacturer and individual(s)
appointed as the manufacturer's agent for NHTSA matters but
also (potentially) any individual(s) who fails to speak to NHTSA
(e.g., by falsifying, concealing, or covering up a material fact36 with
actual knowledge that the statement is false or concealed) as well
as anyone found to have aided and abetted in intentionally
misleading NHTSA, regardless of where the false statements were
made (i.e., foreign manufacturer's representatives could, therefore,
be covered).
Confused manufacturers may take some comfort in
statements by NHTSA officials that the criminal provisions will be
invoked rarely" as well as from the TREAD "safe harbor"
provision that offers protection from criminal prosecution where a
person corrects any improper reports or failures to report within a
"reasonable time." 8 What constitutes a "reasonable time" was left
by Congress for NHTSA to define through a separate rulemaking,
which NHTSA was to complete within ninety days of enactment of
TREAD (i.e., January 29, 2001)." 9 After first suggesting twenty434. 49 U.S.C. § 30170.
435. But see Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S.
88, 90 (1994) (dismissing the case because the DOJ did not authorize the
appeal).
436. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1).
437. See Miles Moore, TREAD Act Reality: NHTSA's Powers Now Greatly
Expanded, TIRE Bus., Apr. 1, 2002, at 9 (quoting Kenneth Weinstein,
NHTSA's Administrator for Safety Assurance).
438. 49 U.S.C. § 30170.

439. Id. Within 90 days of the TREAD Act's enactment, "the Secretary [i.e.,
NHTSA] shall establish by regulation what constitutes a reasonable time for
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one days in an interim final rule as the "reasonable time period,""'
NHTSA finally decided upon thirty days in the final rule, which
was published on July 23, 2001, nearly six months later than
envisaged under TREAD."' In first suggesting twenty-one days,
NHTSA considered the following factors: (1) NHTSA's mission
under the Vehicle Safety Act "to collect complete and accurate
information in order to decide whether to open investigations of
potential defects, to conduct those investigations efficiently and
expeditiously, and to assure appropriate oversight of ongoing
recalls;" (2) "real world" considerations (i.e., to encourage the use
of the safe harbor provision, the time period must be long enough
for the provision to be usable in real world situations); and (3)
used by other federal
comparable safe harbor rules and policies
2
agencies, such as EPA, IRS, and FAA."
However, comments submitted by the Motor and Equipment
Manufacturers Association ("MEMA") and the Original Equipment
Suppliers Association ("ESA") on the twenty-one-day period
caused NHTSA to reconsider. MEMA and OESA argued that,
because of the "wide disparities in size, sophistication and legal
support among motor vehicle and vehicle parts manufacturers," a
smaller industry company would need more than twenty-one days
to consult with legal counsel about the implications of submitting
the corrected information and admitting a felony violation."
Although not persuaded by MEMA and OESA's reasoning, NHTSA
nevertheless extended the time period to thirty calendar days.
According to NHTSA, although "21 days ordinarily would be a
sufficient time for violators to correct their improper actions,
[NHTSA was] willing to make reasonable accommodations in light
The thirty-day period will run
of concerns of small businesses."'
from the date of the improper report to NHTSA or the date of the
Finally, the safe harbor is
failure to report to NHTSA. " '
[the safe harbor provision] and what manner of correction is sufficient for
Nevertheless, the House Commerce
purposes [of the safe harbor]." Id.
Committee expected NHTSA to define a "reasonable time" as "some point after
the person is aware that a defect or noncompliance related to the falsified or
concealed information exists and that the defect or noncompliance has caused
serious bodily injury." H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15.
440. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed.
Reg. 81,414, 81,415 (Dec. 26, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578).
441. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed.
Reg. 38,380, 38,382 (July 24, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578).
442. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 81,415.
443. Motor Vehicle Safety- Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 38,382.
444. Id.
445. Id. In order for the correction to be timely, it must be received by
NHTSA on or before the (30th) calendar day, not merely mailed or otherwise
sent before that day. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor
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apparently intended to apply only to the 44newly
added criminal
6
provisions (not the civil penalty provisions).
In addition to correcting the information within the 30-day
time period, to qualify for the safe harbor protection, the person (1)
must have lacked knowledge at the time of the violation that the
violation would result in an accident causing death or serious
bodily injury 7 and (2) correct the improper reports or failure to
report in the "correct" format. The lack of knowledge element is
consistent with the underlying criminal penalty provisions, which
require a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which in turn (as discussed
above) presupposes a "knowing and willful" misrepresentation. 4
The "correct" format must accomplish the following: (a) specifically
identify all items of information and documents that were
improper or not provided to NHTSA and is related to a submission
under 49 U.S.C. § 30166, or a regulation, requirement, or order
issued there under; and (b) correct all reporting errors, including
providing NHTSA with all missing or corrected information."9 For
a corporation, the correction must be signed by an authorized
person (usually the individual officer or employee who submitted
the information or who should have provided missing information,
or someone in the company with authority to make such a
submission).°
Finally, the safe harbor applies only to criminal liability
related the reporting obligations: 451 (1) Reporting on Defects in

Provision, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,416. The correction must: (1) identify with
specificity all items of information and documents that were improper or were
not provided and (2) correct all reporting improprieties and failures for which
the protections of the safe harbor provision are sought, including providing
NHTSA with all missing or corrected documents and information. Id. For a
corporation to properly make a correction, the correction (letter) must be
signed by an authorized person (ordinarily the individual officer or employee
who submitted the information or who should have provided missing
information, or someone in the company with authority to make such a
submission). Id.
446. 146 CONG. REC. S10,273 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen.
McCain). "In explaining the safe harbor provision under the enhanced penalty
section, the intent of the House sponsors is not necessary because it is clear on
the face of the language that it would not apply to an underlying violation of
existing criminal law." Id.
447. 49 U.S.C. § 30170..
448. See supra notes 428-431 and accompanying text; see also Motor Vehicle
Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,382.
449. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 81,416.
450. Id. If the person submitting the correction cannot submit the correct
information, then he or she must provide a full detailed description of that
information or of the content of those documents and the reason why he or she
cannot provide them to NHTSA (e.g., the information or documents are not in
his or her possession or control). Id.
451. Motor Vehicle Safety; Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed.
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Foreign Countries; (2) Early Warning Reporting; (3) Ban on the
Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires45 as well as the
previously existing reporting obligations.453 Given the nature of
tire retail outlet centers, which (in contrast to vehicle
manufacturers) may be small businesses, one wonders whether
they will have the legal resources to understand their reporting
obligations and safe harbor provisions to correct failures to report
covered sales or leases.
POSTSCRIPT AND PORTENTS

In August 2002, after Continental AG announced a recall of
595,000 tires installed on Ford Expeditions and Lincoln
Navigators based on warranty claims and fatality accident
information, at least one high-profile consumer advocacy group
hailed the TREAD Act, and in particular the early warning
reporting requirements, as the impetus for the recall decision. M
In late February 2004, NHTSA announced the first tire recall
as a result of the TREAD Act's early warning rules. Ironically, the
recall was conducted by Bridgestone/Firestone on 290,000
Firestone Steeltex Radial AT tires equipped on Ford Excursion
NHTSA stated that the first data
sport utility vehicles.4 55
indicating a defect trend came in December 2003 as part of the

Reg. at 38,381.
452. TREAD § 3(a)-(c).
453. See supra note 421.
454. See Bill Koenig, ContinentalRecalls SUV Tires; Accident Involving Ford
Expedition Triggers Precaution,WASH. POST, Aug, 20, 2002, at E03 (quoting
Clarence Ditlow, President of the Center for Auto Safety, as having said:
"We're beginning to see the fruits of the TREAD Act and early-warning
system") Continental described the problem to NHTSA as "even wear,
vibration, or especially under the condition of overloading or under-inflation in
high ambient temperature usage, separation between the belt edges
potentially leading to tread detachment." Id.
Perhaps Continental was
motivated at least in part by a desire to avoid (or minimize) potential
piggyback litigation. According to AMR Research (an independent research
analyst firm), product liability claims are likely to triple as a result of the data
required under TREAD. Ralph Kisiel, Quick Fix: Nothing Hurts a New
Vehicle's Image Like a PostlaunchProblem, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003,
at
24.
For
more
information
on
AMR
Research,
see
http://www.amrresearch.com/AboutUs.
455. Danny Hakim, Another Recall Involving Ford, Firestone Tires and
S.U.V.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at Cl; Greg Schneider, FirestoneRecalling
297,000 Steeltex Tires, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at E01. Some of the
Steeltex tires were used as original equipment after Ford severed its ties with
Firestone in 2001. Jeff Plungis, Feds: Tire Warning is Working, DET. NEWS,
Feb. 27, 2004, at lB. According to Firestone, the tires fail when the vehicle is
overloaded or the tire is under-inflated. Id. Firestone said it would have
conducted the recall even without NHTSA's review of the TREAD data. Miles
Moore, BFS Was Ready to Notify NHTSA of Steeltex Tires, TIRE Bus., Mar. 15,
2004, at 3.
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first quarterly TREAD report (covering the third quarter of
2003). 456 This data disclosed three accidents that led to five deaths
and four other accidents that led to injuries.457 Within two months,
Bridgestone/Firestone announced the $30 million voluntary
recall.458

In March 2004, General Motors announced a recall of 3.66
million pickups and sport-utility vehicles to remedy defective
tailgate cables, representing the company's biggest recall in
twenty-three years.459

What these recalls have in common is that they all occurred
in the wake of the TREAD Act's early warning rules. "The logic
has changed since Firestone," says Rebecca Lindland, a forecaster
for Global Insight, Inc, "[t]he last thing [auto companies] want in
the media40 is evidence they knew something and didn't do
anything."
Complying with the TREAD Act's early warning reporting

requirements continues to be one of the largest challenges facing
automotive companies.

The early warning rules are now set.

NHTSA can now compare company versus company performance
on warranty claims, consumer complaints, and field reports, to
name just a few data sources.
With the largest computer database outside the U.S. military,
NHTSA sits on a wealth of information. It remains to be seen if
NHTSA can process this information-much of which is wholly

inadequate to identify safety-related defect trends-in a reliable,
meaningful, and consistent manner. The Inspector General's
recent follow-up audit casts doubt on NHTSA's current ability to

do so.
456. Hakim, supra note 455; See also Denial of Motor Vehicle Recall
Petition, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,221, 58,223 (Sept. 29, 2004) (in explaining the role of
the TREAD Act's early warning data on this recall, NHTSA stated that it
"began receiving [early warning] data from all major tire manufacturers in
December of 2003. This includes data on production, [warranty claims],
property damage claims, and death and injury claims and notices. Scrutiny of
these data earlier this year contributed to the [Steeltex tire] recall.")
457. See Hakim, supra note 455.
458. Id.
Amy Wilson, Bridgestone Recalls Firestones on Excursions,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, March 1, 2004, at 46. On September 29, 2004, NHTSA
denied two petitions submitted to NHTSA by the Law Offices of Lisoni &
Lisoni of Pasadena, California that requested the agency open a defect
investigation into all Firestone Steeltex tires manufactured since 1995 and
into Steeltex tires installed on ambulances. See Denial of Motor Vehicle Recall
Petition, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,221 (Sept. 29, 2004).
459. See Jeff Green, GM Recall Biggest in 23 Years, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar.
19, 2004, http://www.freep.com/money/autonews/gml9_20040319.htm.
The
recall affects model years 2000 to 2004 Chevrolet Silverado pickups and GMC
Sierra pickups built between October 1999 and October 2003, and some
Chevrolet Avalanche sport-utility vehicles and Cadillac Escalade luxury sportutility vehicles. Id.
460. Id.
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To its credit, NHTSA has promised to review the early
warning rule within two years after the initial reports are
received-that is to say, the summer of 2005. By that time,
NHTSA should know what sources are useful and not useful.
Those that are not useful should be shut down so that NHTSA can
stop chasing red herrings and use its resources more effectively,
and manufacturers can return their resources devoted to red
herrings back to shareholders, employees, and customers.

